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Fail-safe Federalism and Climate Change:  
The Case of U.S. and Canadian Forest Policy 
BLAKE HUDSON 
Recent research demonstrates the difficulties that federal systems of government may 
present for international treaty formation, a prime example being legally binding treaties 
aimed at harnessing global forests to regulate climate change.  Some federal constitutions, 
such as the U.S. and Canadian constitutions, grant subnational governments virtually 
exclusive direct forest management regulatory authority for non-federally owned forests.  
With subnational governments controlling sixty-five percent of forests in the United States 
and eighty-four percent in Canada, the U.S. and Canadian federal governments may be 
constrained during international negotiations and unable to legally bind subnational 
governments to any agreement prescribing methods of utilizing these forests to combat 
climate change.  These constraints are especially important since these two countries 
control fifteen percent of the world’s forests.  Decentralized forest policy in the U.S. and 
Canada certainly provides valuable benefits.  Yet constitutional decentralization in federal 
systems should be more effectively balanced with global forest governance if that 
mechanism for addressing climate change is to be preserved in its most flexible form.  
Though a binding agreement has yet to materialize, and other increasingly touted 
mechanisms may be utilized to tackle climate change, it is imperative that world 
governments maintain every legal and policy tool at their disposal to address the problem.   
A recent comparative constitutional analysis of five federal systems controlling fifty-
four percent of global forests determined that the United States and Canada lack two of the 
three key elements of federal constitutional structure that best facilitate a federal nation’s 
ability to enter into and successfully implement an international climate agreement 
including forests while also preserving the recognized benefits of decentralized forest 
policy.  This Article addresses how these constitutional deficiencies might be remedied to 
achieve more effective climate and forest governance.  In other words, the Article explores 
mechanisms for establishing “Fail-safe Federalism” for forest management in the United 
States and Canada, by first highlighting the domestic nuances of both constitutional 
structure and forest policy in the two countries and next assessing whether top-down, 
bilateral, horizontal, or transnational approaches are the most effective mechanisms for 
forging Fail-safe Federalism within each. 
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Fail-safe Federalism and Climate Change:  
The Case of U.S. and Canadian Forest Policy 
BLAKE HUDSON
*
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Climate change is perhaps the most important environmental issue of 
our time.  Yet it is also the most complex.  While it is difficult to craft a 
regulatory solution or a cooperative response among nations for most 
global governance issues, it is especially challenging in the case of climate 
change.  Scientific uncertainty regarding climate change’s potential 
impacts, the difficulties in measuring and predicting changing climatic 
conditions, the global scale of the problem, the innumerable sources of 
greenhouse gases, the role of those sources in forming the very carbon-
constructed foundation upon which society operates, and the political and 
jurisdictional complexities arising out of these factors make climate change 
an exceptionally difficult environmental and global governance challenge.  
It is therefore imperative that world governments and citizens both 
maintain and are able to effectively use every legal and policy tool at their 
disposal in the battle against climate change.  More specifically, the global 
nature of the problem requires that each nation be able to successfully 
utilize mechanisms of domestic governance to forge a collaborative 
international response.  Such a response could take many forms, ranging 
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assistant Ally Jenks for all of her hard work and insight.  I am grateful to the United Nations Institute 
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Law Review for their wonderful suggestions, edits, and effort.  I dedicate this article to my son, 
Campbell Lee Hudson, with whom I look forward to exploring the beautiful forests of the U.S. and 
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from individualized action by single nations, to transnational actions,
1
 to a 
legally binding global treaty.  Even so, the utilization of a global treaty 
may be diminished, as recent scholarship demonstrates that domestic 
governance limitations in the form of constitutional federalism may 
complicate the implementation of a non-self-executing, legally binding 
climate change treaty or perhaps even thwart treaty formation in the first 
instance.
2
 
Countries with federal systems of government, such as the United 
States and Canada, pose a particular challenge to a variety of international 
negotiations
3
 because regulatory authority over treaty subject matter may 
be constitutionally decentralized
4
 and divided in an exclusive manner 
between the national and subnational governments.  As a result, 
subnational governments may legally constrain national governments 
during international negotiations by resisting domestic treaty 
implementation as outside the scope of the national government’s 
                                                                                                                          
1 These include voluntary or other arrangements between select groups of nations and/or non-
governmental organizations.  Scholars have highlighted a recent trend toward bottom-up and flexible 
transnational approaches to engaging in global environmental governance in the absence of a 
centralized, legally binding international arrangement.  See Kenneth Abbott, The Transnational Regime 
Complex for Climate Change, ENVTL. & PLAN. C: GOV’T & POL’Y (forthcoming); Daniel Bodansky, A 
Tale of Two Architectures: The Once and Future U.N. Climate Change Regime, (Ariz. St. C. of Law, 
Working Paper, March 7, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1773865. 
2 See Blake Hudson, Federal Constitutions, Global Governance, and the Role of Forests in 
Regulating Climate Change, 87 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 3) [hereinafter Hudson, 
Federal Constitutions] (noting that federalism within a nation’s constitution may complicate efforts to 
forge non-self-executing legally binding climate change treaties); Blake Hudson, Climate Change, 
Forests and Federalism: Seeing the Treaty for the Trees, 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 363, 369 (2011) 
[hereinafter Hudson, Climate Change] (noting how federalism restrains the United States’ ability to 
implement international climate change treaties); Blake Hudson & Erika Weinthal, Seeing the Global 
Forest for the Trees: How U.S. Federalism Can Coexist with Global Governance of Forests, 1 J. NAT. 
RESOURCES POL’Y RES. 353, 353–54 (2009) (explaining how in the United States, federalism 
complicates efforts to execute any legally binding climate change treaty that includes forests). 
3 Examples include negotiations related not only to the environment, but also human rights, 
criminal law and punishment, and commerce and trade.  Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and 
American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390, 402–06 (1998). 
4 Scholars have observed that  
federations use the principle of constitutional non-centralization rather than 
decentralization.  In other words, when independent states decide to create a 
federation and a federal system of government, they confer, generally through a 
constitution, certain specific responsibilities and authorities to the federal 
government in the interest of all states. . . . [F]or these reasons, use of the term 
decentralized is somewhat awkward in the case of federal governments. 
Hans M. Gregersen et al., Forest Governance in Federal Systems: An Overview of Experiences and 
Implications for Decentralization, in THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION: FORESTS, PEOPLE AND 
POWER 13, 14–15 (Carol J. Pierce Colfer & Doris Capistrano eds., 2005). 
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constitutional authority.
5
  The complications presented by federal systems 
of government for international negotiations have critical implications for 
global climate governance—at least to the extent that countries wish to 
preserve a legally binding treaty as one mechanism for addressing climate 
change.  Worldwide there are only twenty-four federal systems of 
government
6
 compared to over 160 unitary systems.
7
  Thus, only thirteen 
percent of the world’s governments are federal and subject to potential 
legal constraints posed by subnational governments.
8
  Yet while there are 
far fewer federal systems of government than unitary systems, 
approximately forty-six percent of the world’s land base9 (and associated 
natural resources) and between seventy and eighty percent of the world’s 
forests
10—a resource crucial to combating climate change11—are contained 
                                                                                                                          
5 By contrast, nation-states with centralized, or “unitary,” systems of government may act without 
legal constraint during international negotiations—the lack of exclusive subnational constitutional 
authority over certain subject matters in these countries allows central governments to freely obligate 
their respective nations to the requirements of a legally binding treaty.  “Unitary” systems of 
government “may have subnational levels of governments; but these are not constitutionally 
empowered to make decisions on major government services and functions; rather, they are subordinate 
units,” id. at 15, intended to “balance the burden of governance.”  Ian Ferguson & Cherukat 
Chandrasekharan, Paths and Pitfalls of Decentralization for Sustainable Forest Management: 
Experiences of the Asia Pacific Region, in THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION, supra note 4, at 63, 
65. 
6 Federalism by Country, F. FED., http://www.forumfed.org/en/federalism/by_country/index.php 
(last visited Dec. 16, 2011). 
7 Unitary State, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unitary_state (last visited Dec. 16, 
2011). 
8 Unitary action at the national level may certainly be politically thwarted by subnational interest 
groups or powerful subnational government influence, but unitary governments maintain the legal 
authority to act if and when they politically choose to do so.  In federal systems, even in the presence of 
national government political will, any one subnational actor may challenge a national act as 
unconstitutional and may succeed in having national regulatory action thwarted. 
9 The total surface area of the earth is 148,940,000 km2.  Federal systems of government maintain 
the following surface areas: Argentina: 2,766,890 km2; Australia: 7,617,930 km2; Austria: 83,872 km2; 
Belgium: 30,528 km2; Bosnia and Herzegovina: 51,209 km2; Brazil: 8,514,877 km2; Canada: 9,984,670 
km2; Comoros: 2,235 km2; Ethiopia: 1,104,300 km2; Germany: 357,021 km2; India: 3,287,263 km2; 
Iraq: 438,317 km2; Malaysia: 329,847 km2; Mexico: 1,972,550 km2; Micronesia: 702 km2; Nepal: 
147,181 km2; Nigeria: 923,768 km2; Pakistan: 796,095 km2; Russia: 17,075,400 km2; Saint Kitts and 
Nevis: 261 km2; Sudan: 2,505,813 km2; Switzerland: 41,285 km2; United Arab Emirates: 83,600 km2; 
United States: 9,826,675 km2; Venezuela: 916,445 km2.  Thus, federal nation total surface area is 
68,858,734 km2, or roughly forty-six percent of the world’s total surface area.  See Countries of the 
World Ordered by Land Area, LIST OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, 
http://www.listofcountriesoftheworld.com/area-land.html (last visited Dec. 16, 2011). 
10  Arnoldo Contreras-Hermosilla et al., Forest Governance in Countries with Federal Systems of 
Government, 39 GOVERNANCE BRIEF 1 (2008), available at 
http://www.cifor.cgiar.org/publications/pdf_files/GovBrief/GovBrief0739E.pdf.  
11 See A. Angelsen, REDD Models and Baselines, 10 INT’L FORESTRY REV. 465, 465 (2008) 
(explaining how environmental non-governmental organizations have come to realize that failing to 
address tropical deforestation is dangerous, given that deforestation currently accounts for one fifth of 
global greenhouse gas emissions); T. Johns et. al., A Three-Fund Approach to Incorporating 
Government, Public and Private Forest Stewards Into a REDD Funding Mechanism, 10 INT’L 
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within federal systems of government.  This is both the great irony and the 
great challenge of our time: the placement of the vast majority of one of 
the most critical resources to combating global climate change largely 
within systems of government with the greatest potential to complicate 
holistic global responses through international legal instruments. 
The role of the United States and Canada in climate change and global 
forest management negotiations provides a compelling case study of the 
potential impact of federal systems on global governance via international 
treaty.  The international community is increasingly looking to harness the 
power of carbon sequestration via improved forest management as a 
mechanism to combat climate change,
12
 and “realization of the significance 
of climate change impacts of greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation 
and forest degradation has brought renewed impetus to efforts to conserve 
and better manage forests globally.”13  Nearly twenty percent of annual 
global carbon emissions result from forest loss and degradation,
14
 an 
amount greater than emitted by the global transportation sector each year.
15
  
As a result, mechanisms to achieve “Reduced Emissions from 
Deforestation and Degradation” (REDD) have been placed on the agenda 
of both future international climate negotiations and negotiations related to 
establishing a global sustainable forest management regime.
16
  Not only is 
forest destruction a substantial source of atmospheric carbon, but a recent 
U.S. Forest Service report found that one-third of global carbon emissions 
are absorbed by forests each year, making forests the most significant 
terrestrial carbon sink.
17
  Consequently, preservation of forests provides a 
multiplied effect in regulating greenhouse gases; and, correspondingly, 
forest destruction amplifies concentrations of carbon in the atmosphere 
                                                                                                                          
FORESTRY REV. 458, 459 (noting that the role of deforestation in global climate change is widely 
recognized amongst science and policy experts); A. Karsenty et. al., Summary of the Proceedings of the 
International Workshop “The International Regime, Avoided Deforestation and the Evolution of Public 
and Private Policies Towards Forests in Developing Countries” Held in Paris, 21–23rd November 
2007, 10 INT’L FORESTRY REV. 424, 424 (2008) (noting how the role of forests in effecting climate 
change reforms is increasingly emphasized); K. Levin et al., The Climate Regime as Global Forest 
Governance: Can Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) Initiatives 
Pass a ‘Dual Effectiveness’ Test?, 10 INT’L FORESTRY REV. 538, 539 (2008) (noting consensus 
amongst experts that the world’s forests are under stress). 
12 See Levin, supra note 11, at 539 (describing how environmental groups, firms, industry 
associations, and governments are focusing on forest management policies to address climate change). 
13 CONSTANCE L. MCDERMOTT ET AL., GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL FOREST POLICIES: AN 
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON 4 (2010). 
14 Id. at 6. 
15 Erin C. Myers, Policies to Reduce Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD), 
RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE 4 (2007), http://www.rff.org/documents/RFF-DP-07-50.pdf. 
16 MCDERMOTT, supra note 13, at 6. 
17 News Release, USDA Forest Service, US Forest Service Finds Global Forests Absorb One-
Third of Carbon Emissions Annually (July 14, 2011), available at http://www.fs.fed.us/news/2011/ 
releases/07/carbon.shtml. 
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since it constitutes both a source of carbon and the loss of a significant 
carbon sink. 
The United States and Canada alone account for over thirteen percent 
of the world’s land base,18 over fifteen percent of the world’s forests,19 and 
maintain two of the top ten world economies as measured by annual gross 
domestic product
20—carbon-based economies to be certain.  With these 
two nations controlling such a significant amount of the world’s natural 
and financial capital, full and unconstrained participation by the United 
States and Canada in international climate negotiations is of crucial 
importance if that route of response is ultimately chosen.  Even so, the 
involvement of these two federal systems in global climate governance 
related to forests is hindered by legal constraints that subnational 
governments may place on national government involvement in 
international negotiations. 
For example, U.S. regulatory authority over forest management is 
currently constitutionally divided between federal and state governments, 
with state governments responsible for regulating the nearly sixty-five 
percent of U.S. forests owned by subnational governments (five percent) or 
private parties (sixty percent).
21
  As a result, if the federal government 
sought to obligate the United States to certain types of forest management 
directives within an international climate treaty, it may arguably do so only 
on the thirty-five percent of nationally owned forests over which it 
maintains constitutional control.
22
  This is because a non-self-executing 
treaty would require Congress to pass implementing legislation that would 
invariably be challenged by state governments and private property owners 
as beyond the scope of the U.S. treaty power and other federal powers, and 
as intruding upon a regulatory role constitutionally reserved to state 
governments.  Thus nearly two-thirds of the United States’ forested lands 
would be outside the orbit of the treaty, rendering the United States in 
violation of its international obligations.  Furthermore, the United States 
would likely be less inclined to even enter into serious international 
negotiations based upon perceived federalism constraints.  In this way 
                                                                                                                          
18  See Countries of the World Ordered by Land Area, supra note 9. 
19 Of the world’s approximately four billion hectares of forest, Canada maintains 310 million 
hectares and the United States 302 million hectares.  JACEK P. SIRY ET AL., XIII WORLD FORESTRY 
CONGRESS, GLOBAL FOREST OWNERSHIP: IMPLICATIONS FOR FOREST PRODUCTION, MANAGEMENT, 
AND PROTECTION 3 tbl.1 (2009), available at http://www.pefc.org/images/stories/documents/external/ 
global_forest_ownership_FD.pdf.   
20 World Economic Outlook Database, INT’L MONETARY FUND (Sept. 2011), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/01/weodata/index.aspx. 
21 U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT OUTLOOK 3: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 
PERSPECTIVES 110 (2002), available at http://www.unep.org/geo/GEO3/english/pdf.htm (follow 
“Forests” hyperlink) (last visited Dec. 16, 2011). 
22 See id. (noting that the federal government publically owns and manages only thirty-five 
percent of forests in the country). 
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legal perception is often political reality in the United States, as the 
government politically refuses to act both domestically and internationally 
based upon perceived constitutional constraints.
23
 
The consequences of this constitutional state of affairs for U.S. forests 
are substantial.  The U.S. Forest Service recently released a report detailing 
the projected impacts that population growth, urbanization, climate change, 
timber markets, and invasive species will have on southeastern U.S. forests 
alone over the next fifty years, finding that these factors may reduce forest 
cover by as much as twenty-three million acres, or approximately thirteen 
percent of total forestland in the south.
24
  Not surprisingly, southeastern 
U.S. forests also maintain the highest proportion of private forest 
ownership,
25
 meaning that under current understandings of constitutional 
law, a prescriptive regulatory response at national or international levels 
may be an unavailable mechanism for avoiding this dramatic loss of U.S. 
forest cover and the carbon sequestration and other ecosystem service 
benefits forests provide. 
Similarly, the Canadian Constitution grants the provinces exclusive 
forest management regulatory authority over non-federally owned forests.  
Thus the provinces maintain control over nearly all of the nation’s forests 
since eighty-four percent of Canadian forests are owned by the provinces 
or private parties.
26
  The provinces place even more constraints on the 
Canadian national government in international negotiations than do the 
states in the United States because while U.S. state hegemony over 
                                                                                                                          
23 See Hudson, Federal Constitutions, supra note 2 (manuscript at 14) (describing how the U.S. 
government “acts as if its hands are tied due to perceived legal constraints”).  Curtis Bradley has 
observed that “in a number of instances in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, U.S. 
officials declined to enter into negotiations concerning private international law treaties because of a 
concern that the treaties would infringe on the reserved powers of the states.”  Curtis A. Bradley, The 
Treaty Power and American Federalism, Part II, 99 MICH. L. REV. 98, 131–32 (2000) (citing Kurt H. 
Nadelmann, Ignored State Interests: The Federal Government and International Efforts to Unify Rules 
of Private Law, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 323 (1954), and HAROLD W. STOKE, THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF 
THE FEDERAL STATE 187–88 (1931)).  Additionally, the United States has invoked federalism and 
states’ rights to avoid international treaties related to labor conditions.  Id. at 132.  Perceived federalism 
limitations have also reduced the United States’ bargaining power during international negotiations as 
the United States has sought both treaty exemptions to reduce state obligations and concessions for 
states in domestic implementation.  Edward T. Swaine, Does Federalism Constrain the Treaty Power?, 
103 COLUM. L. REV. 403, 408–10 (2003).  Examples include the United States’ opposition to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, treaty exemptions for the states within human rights treaties, 
and the Agreement on Government Procurement, and concessions to the states in domestic 
implementation of trade matters, such as in the Uruguay Round Agreements Act.  Id. at 408–10. 
24 DAVID N. WEAR & JOHN G. GREIS, U.S. FOREST SERV., THE SOUTHERN FOREST FUTURES 
PROJECT: SUMMARY REPORT 26–31, 35 (2011), available at http://www.srs.fs.usda.gov/futures/ 
reports/draft/summary_report.pdf. 
25  Eighty-six percent of Southeastern forests are privately owned.  Id. at 58. 
26 CAN. COUNSEL OF FOREST MINISTERS, SUSTAINABLE FOREST MANAGEMENT IN CANADA 4, 
(2010), available at http://www.sfmcanada.org/english/pdf/SFMBooklet_E_US.pdf. (last visited Jul. 
25, 2011). 
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subnational forest management has been understood as a “reserved power” 
for the states in the absence of a recognized enumerated federal power, 
Canadian provincial hegemony over forests is made explicit in the text of 
the Canadian Constitution.  So while the United States may have some 
flexibility to exert federal authority over subnational forests under the 
Commerce Clause or some other federal power (though direct regulation 
has never before been attempted), the Canadian federal government’s 
options are expressly limited.  In addition, and also unlike the United 
States, Canadian courts have definitively found that the Canadian treaty 
power is constrained by reserved provincial powers. 
Ultimately, the lack of national or international input into Canadian 
forest practices also has implications for preserving the full slate of climate 
change solutions.  While Canadian boreal forests store a great deal of 
carbon—an estimated sixty-seven billion tons (equal to 303 years of the 
country’s 2002 carbon emissions)—deforestation of nearly 230,000 acres 
of forest a year due to cropland conversion and urbanization is a significant 
source of emissions.
27
  At this rate, over eleven million acres of Canadian 
forest will be lost over the next fifty years.  This is in addition to logging 
activities that remove an average of 122 megatons of carbon dioxide 
equivalent forest carbon a year, an amount that if released into the 
atmosphere would equal sixteen percent of Canada’s total yearly 
greenhouse gas emissions.
28
  Without greater coordination of forest policy, 
either among the provinces or provided by some higher governmental 
authority, destruction of forests in the name of economic development may 
proceed apace as provinces jockey for economic growth and 
development.
29
 
Ultimately, if utilization of full treaty-making authority is to be 
preserved in the context of climate change and appropriately balanced with 
the benefits of decentralized forest governance, federal systems like the 
United States and Canada will need to overcome the holistic resource 
management problems posed by federalism.  In other words, mechanisms 
for forging “Fail-safe Federalism”30 will need to be established in the event 
that U.S. states or Canadian provinces do not unilaterally act to protect 
their respective forests in ways consistent with the needs of a robust global 
                                                                                                                          
27 WORLD WILDLIFE FED’N, CANADA’S BOREAL FORESTS, available at 
assets.panda.org/downloads/canada_forest_cc_final_13nov07_lr_1.pdf. (last visited Dec. 16, 2011). 
28  FORESTETHICS, ROBBING THE CARBON BANK: GLOBAL WARMING & ONTARIO’S BOREAL 
FOREST 3 n.2, available at http://forestethics.org/downloads/globalwarming_2.pdf (last visited Dec. 16, 
2011). 
29 See Blake Hudson, Federal Constitutions: The Keystone of Nested Commons Governance, 63 
ALA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 3, 4) (explaining how the lack of coordination at the 
federal level could potentially give rise to a natural capital commons within national and state 
boundaries). 
30 Hudson, Federal Constitutions, supra note 2 (manuscript at 26). 
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climate change response.  Such mechanisms would allow these countries’ 
federal governments to have the constitutional authority to act as a fail-safe 
by participating in the establishment of national forest objectives based 
upon minimum forest protection standards—standards that may need to be 
coordinated on a global scale to effectively address climate change.  This 
Article analyzes the various mechanisms that may be utilized to facilitate 
Fail-safe Federalism in the context of global forest governance and climate 
change, proceeding in five parts. 
Part II provides background and context for how both the U.S. and 
Canadian brands of constitutional federalism impact global climate 
governance related to forest management through their lack of previously 
identified elements that best balance global forest governance and 
decentralized forest policy-making in federal systems of government.  This 
Part first describes the foundational research upon which this Article 
builds, detailing the elements of federal constitutional orders that best 
strike that balance.  Next, this part details how the U.S. and Canadian 
constitutional orders are missing certain of those elements.  Part III then 
clarifies that despite the similar potential impacts of U.S. and Canadian 
constitutional federalism on global governance, different domestic 
circumstances give rise to widely divergent domestic forest policies 
between the two countries—with Canadian provinces providing a higher 
baseline of minimum forest management standards upon which to build 
toward effective global forest governance, while the United States 
maintains more constitutional authority and flexibility at the federal level 
to allow participation in binding international agreements.  These 
distinctions have important implications for which mechanisms of forging 
Fail-safe Federalism are most appropriate in the respective countries.  Part 
IV then assesses the various mechanisms by which the constitutional 
orders of the United States and Canada might be fortified to allow more 
robust, forest-driven responses to climate change on a global scale.  These 
fail-safes may be driven by internal forces and forged from the current 
constitutional order, or they may be driven by external forces, such as 
transnational pressure to change domestic forest policies.  Importantly, the 
fail-safes that allow the U.S. and Canadian national governments to act 
unconstrained in global forest and climate governance will also allow the 
national governments to perform a fail-safe role domestically—thus 
striking the global forest governance/decentralized forest policy balance.  
Part V concludes. 
II.  BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT: U.S. AND CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
IMPACTS ON GLOBAL CLIMATE AND FOREST GOVERNANCE 
Though the international community has increasingly sought 
mechanisms to utilize global forest management to more effectively 
combat climate change, efforts over the past two decades to harmonize 
 2012] FAIL-SAFE FEDERALISM 935 
national and local forest policies within a legally binding international 
treaty have failed.
31
  This failure is driven both by political disconnects 
between the developed and developing worlds
32
 and the international 
community’s inability to gain the unequivocal support of leading 
developed nations like the United States.
33
  Notwithstanding past failures, 
the international community is increasingly seeking to develop 
mechanisms to facilitate direct inclusion of forest management within a 
future climate agreement.
34
  Even so, recent scholarship demonstrates that 
certain federal systems of government maintain constitutional structures 
insufficient to adequately balance sustainable, decentralized domestic 
forest governance with effective negotiation and implementation of a 
                                                                                                                          
31 Since the late 1980s, nations have made numerous attempts to negotiate a legally binding 
international forest treaty, though each has failed.  Various international fora have facilitated these 
negotiations: the 1992 UN Conference on the Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de 
Janeiro; four sessions of the Intergovernmental Panel on Forests (IPF) between 1995 and 1997; four 
rounds of the Intergovernmental Forum on Forests (IFF) between 1997 and 2000; and, most recently, 
numerous sessions of the United Nations Forum on Forests (UNFF) in the 2000s.  See Radoslav S. 
Dimitrov et al., International Nonregimes: A Research Agenda, 9 INT’L STUD. REV. 230, 243 (2007); 
accord Deborah S. Davenport & Peter Wood, Finding the Way Forward for the International 
Arrangement on Forests: UNFF-5, -6, and -7, 15 REV. OF EUR. CMTY. & INT’L ENVTL. L. 316, 316 
(2006); S. Guéneau & P. Tozzi, Towards the Privatization of Global Forest Governance?, 10 INT’L 
FORESTRY REV. 550, 552 (2008).  The 2007 UNFF talks resulted in a “Non-legally Binding 
Authoritative Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on the Management, Conservation, and 
Sustainable Development of All Types of Forests,” which promotes sustainable forest management 
worldwide and international cooperation on global forest issues.  G.A. Res. 62/98, annex, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/62/98, at 1, 3–4 (Jan. 31, 2008).  Some claim, however, that the instrument “looks unlikely to 
achieve any real consolidation of global forest governance.”  Guéneau, supra, at 552. 
32 The developing world has taken the position that a global forest treaty would allow the 
developed world to raise trade barriers by obligating the developing world to take developmentally 
detrimental action to protect tropical forests while refusing to regulate temperate and boreal forests to 
the same degree.  Radoslav S. Dimitrov, Knowledge, Power, and Interests in Environmental Regime 
Formation, 47 INT’L STUD. Q. 123, 135 (2003). 
33 See Deborah S. Davenport, An Alternative Explanation for the Failure of the UNCED Forest 
Negotiations, 5 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 105, 106 (2005) (noting a lack of willingness on the part of the 
United States to forge an international deforestation treaty); see also Radoslav S. Dimitrov, Hostage to 
Norms: States, Institutions and Global Forest Politics, 5 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL.  1, 3 (2005) (attributing 
the failure of a deforestation treaty partially to U.S. opposition).  The failure of the United States to 
participate is especially significant because the United States is widely considered to be the most 
influential country in the global environmental governance system and U.S. participation is crucial to 
the success of global environmental treaty formation.  See id. at 9–13 (providing several examples of 
efforts by the United States to jettison international climate talks).  Even so, the United States fully 
participates in only one-third of existing international environmental agreements, and refused to ratify 
the current guiding climate change treaty, the Kyoto Protocol.  Katrina L. Fischer, Harnessing the 
Treaty Power in Support of Environmental Regulation of Activities that Don’t “Substantially Affect 
Interstate Commerce”: Recognizing the Realities of the New Federalism, 22 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 167, 199 
(2004).  The Kyoto Protocol was adopted in 1997 and entered into force in 2005.  The protocol 
assigned binding carbon reduction targets and timeframes to “Annex I” industrialized nations, as well 
as general commitments for all signatory nations.  Levin, supra note 11, at 543–44. 
34  See supra note 11. 
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global treaty aimed at setting forest management standards.
35
  With 
between seventy and eighty percent of the world’s forests contained within 
the boundaries of federal systems, these deficiencies need to be addressed.  
 Recent scholarship has identified three elements of federal systems that 
facilitate the “global forest governance/decentralized forest policy” 
balance: (1) national constitutional primacy over both national and 
subnational forest policy; (2) national sharing of constitutional authority 
over forest policy with subnational governments; and (3) forest policy 
institutional enforcement capacity.
36
  After an introduction to these three 
elements in Section II.A, Sections II.B and II.C. detail how the United 
States and Canada each only maintain one element, establishing the basis 
for the suggested mechanisms for forging Fail-safe Federalism presented in 
this Article. 
A.  Elements of Federal Constitutional Orders that Best Balance Global 
Forest Governance and Decentralized Forest Policy-making 
The first element, “[n]ational constitutional primacy” is the feature of a 
federal system whereby the national government maintains constitutional 
authority to guide national and subnational regulatory or management 
standards for a resource subject to an international treaty,
37
 such as forests 
included within a climate treaty.  To be certain, this element should not 
supplant decentralized forest policy-making, which clearly provides many 
benefits, including: reduced central government bureaucracy, corruption, 
and political meddling; more efficient decision-making; better access to 
knowledge of local needs and constraints; increased information flow 
between local and central governments; and greater local cooperation and 
participation in governance.
38
  Achieving these benefits is clearly the 
driving purpose behind establishing a federal form of government in the 
first instance, and these results are important components of effective 
resource governance on local, national, and global scales.  Nonetheless, 
given the increased recognition of the key role of forests in regulating 
global atmospheric carbon, national constitutional primacy gives the 
national government in a federal system the constitutional authority to 
course-correct a trend of “over-decentralization” of forest management 
                                                                                                                          
35 See Hudson, Federal Constitutions, supra note 2 (manuscript at 6–7) (noting that the U.S. 
federal system presents challenges to decentralized forest governance systems). 
36 See generally id. 
37 Id. (manuscript at 23). 
38 Gregersen, supra note 4, at 27–28.  These benefits track the recognized benefits of federalism 
generally: promoting economic growth; providing reciprocity in the enforcement of the law; 
safeguarding against the potential tyranny of centralized power; encouraging local citizen participation 
in governance; experimenting with new forms of governance; and providing administrative efficiency 
through greater shaping of law and policy to local conditions.  Keith S. Rosenn, Federalism in the 
Americas in Comparative Perspective, 26 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 1, 6–7 (1994). 
 2012] FAIL-SAFE FEDERALISM 937 
policy, whereby disaggregated local and national forest policies worldwide 
fail to coordinate in a way that facilitates a holistic and consequential 
climate change response.  As noted by scholars, “[d]ecentralization offers 
great opportunities for improved forest management, but also great 
challenges.  It is far from being a final solution to the ills of the forest 
sector because significant possible disadvantages and dangers threaten its 
potential benefits.”39 These disadvantages include interfering with the 
coordination and implementation of national policies, undermining 
national objectives with inconsistent local objectives, fostering 
environmentally unsustainable decision-making at local levels, losing non-
commercial objectives of national forest policy, and facing pressure to 
extract forest resources for immediate local benefit to the detriment of 
long-term national and global goods and services.
40
 
National constitutional primacy allows the national government to 
“[i]dentify which national policies should override the preferences of 
decentralized bodies and establish clear rules for their enforcement at [the] 
national level” and to further “[e]stablish forest management minimum 
standards for decentralized institutions.”41  It also helps facilitate Fail-safe 
Federalism by “strik[ing] a balance between centralized planning and 
minimum standards at the federal level and decentralized implementation, 
harnessing of local information and expertise, and other benefits at the 
subnational level.”42  This element arises directly out of the constitutional 
order of federal systems and is granted either explicitly by the federal 
constitution or declared jurisprudentially as flowing from some other 
national government power granted by the constitution. 
The second element, national sharing of constitutional forest authority, 
is present in a federal system when the national government maintains 
constitutional primacy over forest policy (element 1) but seeks to achieve 
the most effective management on local scales by sharing forest policy 
decision-making authority with subnational governments.  This element 
provides a mechanism for protecting against “over-centralization” of 
national forest policy.  Indeed, a condition of successful forest governance 
in decentralized systems is “effective and balanced distribution of forest 
related responsibilities and authority among levels of government,”43 
because “[c]ertain forest management decisions are better made at the 
subnational, or even local levels of government, while others may best be 
retained at a central level.”44  Stated differently, national sharing of forest 
                                                                                                                          
39  Gregersen, supra note 4, at 29. 
40 Id. at 28. 
41  Id. at 28–29. 
42 Hudson, Federal Constitutions, supra note 2 (manuscript at 27). 
43 Contreras-Hermosilla, supra note 10, at 7. 
44 Id. 
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authority allows the national government to perform its fail-safe role by 
establishing “minimum standards” without giving rise to the myriad 
problems arising from a national government micromanaging forest policy 
decisions on local scales.  This element is established as a political matter 
and typically arises when the national government uses its legislative 
authority to statutorily establish cooperative federalism arrangements with 
subnational governments. Under these arrangements, subnational 
governments maintain the general authority to formulate forest policy 
while receiving inputs from the national level when aggregated subnational 
policy fails to achieve some national objective crossing subnational 
jurisdictional boundaries, such as watershed and biodiversity protection or 
climate change mitigation.
45
 
The third and final element, institutional enforcement capacity, is 
necessary for a rather obvious reason—without the ability to adequately 
enforce regulatory policy, even a national government that maintains 
constitutional authority to direct forest policy (element 1) and to share that 
authority with subnational governments (element 2) will ultimately be 
ineffectual.  This element reflects the notion that “forest governance is 
strongly dependent on the institutional and political conditions of the 
government in general.”46  Indeed, forest policy scholars note that 
“[c]losing the gap between law and on-ground outcomes is one of the main 
challenges in the forest sector . . . and so issues of enforcement and 
compliance are amongst the most important arenas of policy analysis.”47 
Many of the federal systems that maintain control over important 
forest resources—especially in the developing world—maintain both 
national constitutional primacy over subnational forest management 
(element 1) as well as a sharing of that authority with subnational 
governments (element 2).  Nonetheless, these countries are plagued by 
unclear constitutional divisions of power between national and subnational 
governments, as well as between branches of the national government, a 
great degree of corruption in government, inadequate funding or political 
will for policy enforcement, and a variety of other institutional problems 
that result in direct negative effects on forest policy formulation and 
implementation.  As demonstrated in Figure 1, Brazil, India, and Russia 
fall into this category.
48
 
                                                                                                                          
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 4. 
47 MCDERMOTT, supra note 13, at 21 (internal citation omitted). 
48 The World Justice Project Rule of Law Index rates Brazil, India, and Russia 26th, 56th, and 
40th, respectively (out of sixty-six countries assessed) for the absence of corruption and 24th, 51st, and 
49th, respectively (out of sixty-six countries assessed) for regulatory enforcement.  MARK DAVID 
AGRAST ET AL., THE WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT RULE OF LAW INDEX 2011 47, 66, 90 (2011) 
[hereinafter WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT], available at http://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/ 
files/wjproli2011_0.pdf.  Brazil, India, and Russia also each have a negative score on the 
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Australia, on the other hand, provides an example of a federal system 
that maintains all three elements: Australian courts have interpreted the 
constitution as allowing the federal government to trump what would 
otherwise be exclusive subnational authority whenever the federal 
government enters into an international treaty (element 1).
49
  In response, 
the Australian federal government has established legislative cooperative 
federalism arrangements to share that authority with subnational 
governments in the area of forest management—effectively tying its own 
hands to achieve the benefits of decentralized forest governance (element 
2).
50
  Finally, Australia maintains sufficient institutional enforcement 
capacity (element 3).
51
 
As further discussed in Sections II.B and II.C, the United States and 
Canada only maintain one of these elements—institutional enforcement 
capacity—giving rise to the suggested fail-safe mechanisms presented in 
Part IV. 
 
                                                                                                                          
Environmental Regulatory Regimes Index.  MCDERMOTT, supra note 13, at 43 fig.2.5.  The 
Environmental Regulatory Regimes Index, which was developed by Yale and Columbia Universities, 
“integrates assessment of the stringency of the environmental pollution standards, the sophistication of 
regulatory structure, the quality of available environmental information, the extent of subsidization of 
natural resources, the strictness of enforcement, and the quality of environmental institutions.”  Id. at 
43–44. 
49 See Hudson, Federal Constitutions, supra note 2 (manuscript at 34) (citing Commonwealth v. 
Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1 (Austl.), and Marcus B. Lane, Regional Forest Agreements: Resolving 
Resource Conflicts or Managing Resource Politics?, 37 AUSTL. GEOGRAPHICAL STUD. 142, 144 
(1999)). 
50 See Hudson, Federal Constitutions, supra note 2 (manuscript at 34–39). 
51 The World Justice Project Rule of Law Index rates Australia 9th (out of sixty-six countries 
assessed) for the absence of corruption and 7th (out of sixty-six countries assessed) for regulatory 
enforcement.  WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 48, at 42.  Australia also has a positive score on 
the Environmental Regulatory Regimes Index developed by Yale and Columbia Universities.  See 
MCDERMOTT, supra note 13, at 43 fig.2.5. 
 940 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:925 
Figure 1. 
 
 
B.  Status of Elements in the United States 
The U.S. Constitution contains no explicit constitutional authority for 
either the federal government or the states to regulate the sixty-five percent 
of U.S. forests in either private or state ownership.  As a result, subnational 
forest management regulation is a role reserved for the state governments 
under the Constitution, undertaken pursuant to state and local authority to 
regulate land use.  State governments have long maintained the primary 
responsibility of regulating land use under their authority to exercise the 
“police power” to protect the “general welfare.”52  The Tenth Amendment, 
which reserves powers not constitutionally granted to the federal 
government for the states, places limits on Congress’s regulatory authority 
                                                                                                                          
52 See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 646–47 (1887) (stating that under the Constitution a state 
may only restrain a use of private property through exercise of its police power, and determining that a 
proper exercise of a state’s police power is that which “is necessary and reasonable for guarding against 
the evil which injures or threatens the [general] welfare in the given case . . . .”). 
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“in traditional areas of state and local authority, such as land use,”53 and 
“[l]and use law has always been a creature of state and local law.”54  The 
U.S. Supreme Court solidified this constitutional role for the states in the 
seminal land-use regulatory case of Euclid v. Ambler Realty,
55
 which has 
been described as a “sweeping paean to the supremacy of state regulation 
over private property.”56  Further, the U.S. Supreme Court itself has 
recognized “the States’ traditional and primary power over land . . . use,”57 
and that “[r]egulation of land use . . . is a quintessential state and local 
power.”
58
  In the context of subnational forest management, scholars have 
recognized that “[u]nder the US Constitution, the federal government has 
limited authority and responsibility; all other powers are reserved for the 
states.  Forestland management and use was one such reserved power.”59  
Thus, under current understandings of U.S. constitutional law, the U.S. 
federal government does not maintain national constitutional primacy over 
subnational forest policy (element 1) and therefore cannot share any such 
authority with subnational governments via cooperative federalism 
arrangements (element 2).
60
 
                                                                                                                          
53  James R. May, Constitutional Law and the Future of Natural Resource Protection, in THE 
EVOLUTION OF NATURAL RESOURCES LAW AND POLICY 124, 132 (Lawrence J. MacDonnell & Sarah F. 
Bates eds., 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Other scholars have noted that “[t]he weight of 
legal and political opinion holds that this allocation of power in [the United States] leaves the states in 
charge of regulating how private land is used.”  JOHN R. NOLON ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
LAND USE AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 17 (7th ed. 2008). 
54 Marci A. Hamilton, Federalism and the Public Good: The True Story Behind the Religious 
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 78 IND. L.J. 311, 335 (2003). 
55 Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
56 PAUL GOLDSTEIN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., PROPERTY LAW: OWNERSHIP, USE AND 
CONSERVATION 967 (2006). 
57 Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001) 
(citing Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 44 (1994) (“[R]egulation of land use [is] a 
function traditionally performed by local governments.”)). 
58 Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 738 (2006) (emphasis added); see also FERC v. 
Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 768 n.30 (1982) (“[R]egulation of land use is perhaps the quintessential 
state activity.”) (emphasis added).  For a more general discussion distinguishing permissible, tangential 
influencing effects of U.S. federal statutes on state regulation of forests from arguably impermissible 
federal interference with state constitutional authority over forest management, see Hudson & 
Weinthal, supra note 2, at 405–13. 
59 Gerald A. Rose et al., Forest Resources Decision-Making in the U.S., in THE POLITICS OF 
DECENTRALIZATION, supra note 4, at 238, 239; see also JAN G. LAITOS ET AL., NATURAL RESOURCES 
LAW 849 (2006) (“The laws related to timber management vary depending on whether it takes place on 
private, state, tribal, or federal lands . . . [s]tate timber laws regulate the forestry industry by requiring 
practices designed to minimize water pollution, soil erosion, and fire dangers, and by encouraging or 
requiring deforestation.”).  Despite maintaining the regulatory authority to do so, most states do not 
place legally binding forest management standards upon private forest managers.  As noted by scholars, 
“[a]lthough a few states have laws that regulate forest practices on private land, most rely upon 
voluntary best management practices and technical assistance.”  Rose, supra, at 238 (emphasis added). 
60  As discussed below in Section IV.A.2.i, however, cooperative federalism arrangements can be 
established in the opposite direction—that is, the federal government can entice the states, via 
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Even so, there are two means by which the U.S. federal government 
could attempt to exert constitutional authority over subnational forest 
management.  First, Congress could attempt to pass domestic legislation 
asserting direct control over subnational forest management under one of 
its other enumerated powers, such as the Commerce Clause.  To date, this 
route has not been taken by the federal government, and U.S. courts have 
not had an opportunity to assess the constitutionality of federal private 
forest legislation.  Second, notwithstanding Commerce Clause authority, 
the United States might enter into a legally binding international treaty 
requiring Congress to pass implementing legislation mandating that certain 
forest management directives be carried out on subnationally-owned 
forests.  In such a circumstance, would the federal government’s treaty 
power trump the states’ reserved power under the Tenth Amendment to 
regulate subnational forest management?  Currently, U.S. constitutional 
law scholars are in heated disagreement as to whether the treaty power 
established in Article II of the Constitution
61
 may be constrained by 
constitutional federalism principles.
62
  In one camp are “new 
federalist[s],”63 who assert that recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions64 
place federalism restraints on the United States’ ability to implement 
international treaties requiring the passage of congressional legislation that 
would be unconstitutional if enacted in the absence of a treaty, such as 
legislation intruding into regulatory areas traditionally reserved for the 
states under the Constitution.
65
  On the other side of the debate are 
                                                                                                                          
legislation or other means, to relinquish state authority over forest management to allow federal inputs 
into subnational forest regulatory policy. 
61 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
62 For a thorough discussion of this disagreement and its implications, see Hudson, Climate 
Change, supra note 2, at Section III.A. 
63 See Swaine, supra note 23, at 408 & n.15. 
64 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617–18 (2000) (invalidating a federal domestic 
violence statute on the grounds that it is not a proper exercise of the Commerce Clause, stating 
“[i]ndeed, we can think of no better example of the police power, which the Founders denied the 
National Government and reposed in the States, than the suppression of violent crime and the 
vindication of its victims”); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997) (holding federal statute 
that imposed obligation to perform background checks on prospective handgun purchases 
unconstitutional in accordance with traditional federalism principles); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 
U.S. 507, 511 (1997) (holding the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 exceeds Congress’ 
power); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (holding that the Gun-Free Schools Zones 
Act of 1990 unconstitutional because gun possession in a school zone “neither regulates a commercial 
activity nor contains a requirement that the possession be connected in any way to interstate 
commerce”); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 187 (1992) (“[T]he Constitution protects us 
from our own best intentions: It divides power among sovereigns and among branches of government 
precisely so that we may resist the temptation to concentrate power in one locations as an expedient 
solution to the crisis of the day.”). 
65  See Bradley, supra note 23, at 132 (“[The] nationalist view . . . conflict[s] with the limited and 
enumerated powers structure of the Constitution.”); Bradley, supra note 3, at 394 (“[I]f federalism is to 
be the subject of judicial protection . . . there is no justification for giving the treaty power special 
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“nationalists,” who assert that domestic legislation implemented pursuant 
to an international treaty allows the national government to maintain 
regulatory authority even over matters traditionally regulated by state 
governments and that would otherwise be outside the scope of federal 
constitutional authority in the absence of a treaty.
66
 
Ultimately, though the new federalist/nationalist debate is driven by 
divergent theories of constitutional interpretation, the issue is not settled 
largely due to the narrow fact pattern and unclear reasoning of the seminal 
U.S. Supreme Court case addressing the scope of the treaty power, 
Missouri v. Holland,
67
 decided in 1920.  In Holland, the Supreme Court 
ruled that Congress could pass implementing legislation (the Migratory 
Bird Treaty Act) pursuant to a treaty with Canada, despite a challenge by 
the state of Missouri that the Act was unconstitutional because it interfered 
with the states’ reserved powers under the Tenth Amendment.68  Missouri 
argued that the statute was impermissible in part because states 
traditionally controlled the management of wildlife resources.
69
  The 
Court’s ruling ultimately turned on the fact that the birds were migratory 
(crossing international boundaries) and that the important national interest 
could be adequately managed “only by national action in concert with that 
of another power.”70 
The narrow fact pattern presented in Holland, however, is arguably 
distinguishable from federal regulation of subnational forest management.  
Not only has subnational forest management traditionally been considered 
a land use activity subject to the exclusive regulatory authority of state 
                                                                                                                          
immunity from such protection.”); Duncan B. Hollis, Executive Federalism: Forging New Federalist 
Constraints on the Treaty Power, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1327, 1329–31, 1333 (2006) (contrasting the 
ideologies of the “nationalists” to the “new Federalists”); Fischer, supra note 33, at 176 (proposing a 
framework for the application of federal treaty power that is limited enough to ameliorate federalism 
concerns); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Executing the Treaty Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1867, 1869–
70, 1875 (2005) (analyzing Missouri v. Holland and concluding that “[t]reaties can not expand the 
legislative power of Congress”); Swaine, supra note 23, at 406–08 (arguing recent Supreme Court 
decisions classified a doctrinal resurgence known as “new federalism” placed the United States at risk 
for violating its international treaties). 
66  See David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the 
Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075, 1313–15 (2000) (concluding that 
the “text, structure, precedent, and history” of our “constitutional argument” lends “overwhelming 
support” for the nationalist view); see also Hollis, supra note 65, at 1330–31 (outlining the ideologies 
of the “nationalists,” and summarizing: “[n]ationalists thus reject the idea that federalism imposes 
subject matter limitations on the conclusion or implementation of treaties, even for subjects Congress 
could not otherwise regulate in the treaty’s absence”). 
67 252 U.S. 416 (1920).  Missouri v. Holland has been described as “perhaps the most famous and 
most discussed case in the constitutional law of foreign affairs.”  LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 190 (2d ed. 1996). 
68 Holland, 252 U.S. at 430–31, 434–35. 
69 Id. at 430–31. 
70 Id. at 435. 
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governments,
71
 similar to zoning standards, but unlike wildlife forests are 
owned by identifiable parties, are not a migratory resource, and are not 
“protected only by national action in concert with that of another power.”72  
In fact, numerous constitutional scholars have argued that Holland, at the 
least, should be limited to its facts, is not in line with the nationalist view, 
and should be construed narrowly,
73
 and at the most, should be overruled.
74
 
Ultimately, under current understandings of U.S. constitutional law the 
federal government may be legally constrained from effectively entering 
into and implementing an international climate treaty that seeks a certain 
degree of control over forest management activities
75
 because nearly two-
thirds of U.S. forests are subject to subnational regulatory authority.
76
  This 
presents a “legal” constraint because even if the national government 
politically chose to act, it would only take one private property owner or 
                                                                                                                          
71 Rose, supra note 59, at 239. 
72 Holland, 252 U.S. at 435 (emphasis added).  While this may be true, harnessing the full 
potential of forests to mitigate climate change certainly seems like a result that can only be achieved by 
national action in concert with other governments. 
73 See Swaine, supra note 23, at 412 (“While Missouri v. Holland may survive for the foreseeable 
future, it will likely be read narrowly.”); see also Bradley, supra note 3, at 459 (observing that a brief 
filed by the Clinton administration gives support to the conclusion that the Holland decision would be 
read much more narrowly today); Fischer, supra note 33, at 181 (finding arguments that Missouri v. 
Holland’s holding is still good law unpersuasive in light of recent Supreme Court jurisprudence and the 
modern context of international law-making). 
74 See Rosenkranz, supra note 65, at 1937 (“Missouri v. Holland may be canonical, but it does not 
present a strong case for the application of stare decisis.  It is wrongly decided, and it should be 
overruled.”). 
75 An example would be if the United States signed and ratified an international treaty requiring 
Congress to pass domestic legislation establishing nation-wide forest management standards on 
publicly and privately owned forest lands.  Such standards might take the form of maintenance of 
partial forest cover on forested lands (a prohibition on clear-cutting), implementation of soil erosion 
reduction programs, establishment of nationwide riparian buffer zones in forested watersheds, or 
limitation of fertilizer use.  In fact, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has stated that 
international agreements on forests could ensure the implementation of  
[f]orest management activities to increase stand-level forest carbon stocks[,] 
[which] include harvest systems that maintain partial forest cover, minimize 
losses of dead organic matter (including slash) or soil carbon by reducing soil 
erosion, and by avoiding slash burning and other high-emission activities.  
Planting after harvest or natural disturbances accelerates tree growth and reduces 
carbon losses relative to natural regeneration.  Economic considerations are 
typically the main constraint, because retaining additional carbon on site delays 
revenues from harvest.  The potential benefits of carbon sequestration can be 
diminished where increased use of fertilizer causes greater N2O emissions. 
Gert J. Nabuurs & Omar Masera et al., 9: Forestry, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: MITIGATION, 
CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP III TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 549 (Bert Mertz et al. eds., 2007), available at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/ar4-wg3.htm (follow “Chapter 9: Forestry” hyperlink). 
76 For a broader discussion on the tension between U.S. federalism and international law and 
treaty obligations, see Hudson, Climate Change, supra note 2, at 355–59. 
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one state government combined with the right mix of U.S. Supreme Court 
Justices to have national action blocked by a constitutional challenge.  
Furthermore, as described above, legal perception is often political reality 
in the United States, and the United States has invoked federalism 
limitations in past treaty negotiations on a number of subjects in an effort 
to avoid global agreements restricting traditional state regulatory 
authority.
77
  Without national constitutional primacy (element 1), and 
national sharing of forest policy authority (element 2), the only element of 
the global forest governance/decentralized forest policy balance that the 
U.S. maintains is institutional enforcement capacity (element 3).
78
 
The United States is not the only federal system potentially constrained 
by subnational governments during international climate negotiations.  
Edward Swaine has noted that “[f]ederal states not infrequently seek 
broader concessions based on the political feasibility of national 
implementation, but the arguments that have had purchase are based on 
more genuine constitutional limits.  Much the same may be said with 
respect to . . . outright refusals to participate based on federalism 
grounds.”79  Recent research suggests that Canada also maintains only one 
of the three elements that best facilitate the global forest 
governance/decentralized forest policy balance.
80
  As discussed in the next 
section, Canada’s federal government is more restricted by the provinces 
during global governance efforts than the U.S. federal government is by 
the states. 
C.  Status of Elements in Canada 
Unlike the U.S. Constitution, the Canadian Constitution Act of 1867 
explicitly allocates forest management regulatory authority between the 
federal government and the provinces.
81
  Section 92A delegates 
responsibility for non-federally owned forest regulation and overall 
management exclusively to the provincial governments.
82
  In other words, 
the Canadian Constitution does not allow concurrent jurisdiction over 
                                                                                                                          
77 See supra note 23. 
78 The World Justice Project Rule of Law Index rates the U.S. 17th (out of sixty-six countries 
assessed) for the absence of corruption and 15th (out of sixty-six countries assessed) for regulatory 
enforcement.  World Justice Project, supra note 48, at 103.  The U.S. also has a positive score on the 
Environmental Regulatory Regimes Index developed by Yale and Columbia Universities.  
MCDERMOTT, supra note 13, at 43. 
79 Swaine, supra note 23, at 445–46; see also Hollis, supra note 65, at 1327–1328 (discussing the 
dual nature of treaties as creatures subject to substantive and procedural rules of both international law 
and national law).  
80 See generally, Hudson, Federal Constitutions, supra note 2. 
81 Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 (U.K.), §§ 92–92A, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, app. 
II, no. 5 (Can.). 
82 Id. § 92A. 
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forests,
83
 as do the constitutions of many other federal systems.
84
  This 
explicit grant of authority has significant implications for Canada’s ability 
to both maintain a national forest policy, and to negotiate an international 
climate treaty that includes forests, because eighty-four percent of 
Canada’s forests are non-federally owned (seven percent are privately 
owned and seventy-seven percent are provincially owned).
85
  This is an 
even higher proportion of forests under subnational control than in the 
United States, where state governments are responsible for regulating the 
sixty percent of forests that are privately owned and the five percent of 
forests that are state-owned.
86
 
Passage of Section 92 of the Constitution Act of 1982 reinforced 
provincial authority over subnational forest management by declaring that 
provinces maintain exclusive control over property rights.
87
  Canadian 
courts have broadly construed this constitutional provision to include land 
use and natural resources management.
88
  These amendments to Canada’s 
Constitution place it “beyond dispute that the provinces are primarily 
responsible for forest management.”89  As a result, Canadian forest policy 
is “extremely decentralized,” with national authority over forests being 
“particularly weak.”90  Even the national government itself has come to 
eschew attempts to form a national policy on forest management, declaring 
that “‘[f]orest management is a matter of provincial jurisdiction.  Each 
province and territory has its own set of legislation, policies and 
regulations to govern the management of its forests.’”91  Indeed, the 
Canadian national government has consistently refused to apply national 
environmental laws, forest policies, or international forest management 
agreements to the provinces.
92
 
Despite explicit provincial constitutional authority over forest 
                                                                                                                          
83 Paul Stanton Kibel, Canada’s International Forest Protection Obligations: A Case of Promises 
Forgotten in British Columbia and Alberta, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 231, 247 (1995). 
84 See generally Hudson, Federal Constitutions, supra note 2 (undertaking a comparative 
constitutional analysis of five federal systems: Australia, Brazil, Canada, India, and Russia). 
85 Sustainable, supra note 26, at 4. 
86 U.N. ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMME, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL OUTLOOK 3, supra note 21, at 
110. 
87 Constitution Act, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.), § 92(13), reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, app. II, no. 44 (Can.). 
88 Kibel, supra note 83, at 247. 
89 DAVID R. BOYD, UNNATURAL LAW: RETHINKING CANADIAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND 
POLICY 133 (2003).  Under the Canadian Constitution, however, the federal government does retain the 
role of participating in international negotiations “related to the conservation and use of forests.”  Id. at 
132. 
90 Michael Howlett & Jeremy Rayner, Globalization and Governance Capacity: Explaining 
Divergence in National Forest Programs as Instances of “Next-Generation” Regulation in Canada 
and Europe, 19 GOVERNANCE: AN INT’L J. OF POL’Y, ADMIN., & INSTITUTIONS 251, 265 (2006). 
91 Kibel, supra note 83, at 246 (quoting CANADIAN FOREST SERV., THE STATE OF CANADA’S 
FORESTS 1993 8 (1994)). 
92 Kibel, supra note 83, at 246. 
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management, Section 91 of the Canadian Constitution does grant the 
national government exclusive authority over “trade and commerce” as 
well as “peace, order, and good government.”93  The Canadian Supreme 
Court has construed this provision as including the implementation of 
treaties concerning trade and commerce and other matters of “national 
concern.”94  Certainly climate change would seem to affect both commerce 
and trade in Canadian forest products, and it is clearly a matter of national 
and global concern.  Yet, the Canadian national government has not 
attempted to invoke this constitutional power to justify the implementation 
of international climate and forest agreements, and “[t]he Canadian federal 
government has so far adopted the position that, under the Canadian 
Constitution, its hands are tied.”95  Indeed, scholars have noted that the 
“ambiguous nature of the federal role in . . . forest policy” formation has 
resulted in “a variety of idiosyncratic organizational” mechanisms geared 
toward greater federal input into Canadian forest policy, and “[t]he need 
for governments at both levels [to maintain] greater administrative capacity 
in order to better coordinate increasingly sophisticated policy regimes . . . 
[as is] evident in efforts made at the intergovernmental level to develop 
more effective forest policy structures.”96  This is especially so since 
Canada has been “aggressive” in signing on to various international treaties 
related to forest management, including climate change, even though 
“implementation remains the responsibility of the provinces.”97  As a 
result, scholars have recognized “the need for greater coordination of these 
increasingly sophisticated policy regimes”98 or Canada’s forest practices 
will continue to come under international scrutiny.  Similarly, scholars 
have recognized that Canada must play a role in shaping international 
relations on forests by “vigorously participat[ing] and be[ing] proactive in 
international discussions.”99 
Despite the Canadian national government’s desire to act 
“aggressively” regarding international environmental agreements, the 
Canadian provinces’ exclusive control over direct forest management has 
in the past contributed to Canada’s lack of formal participation in a variety 
                                                                                                                          
93 Id. at 248. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Michael Howlett, Introduction: Policy Regimes and Policy Change in the Canadian Forest 
Sector, in CANADIAN FOREST POLICY 3, 11 (Michael Howlett ed., 2001). 
97 Michael Howlett & Jeremy Rayner, The Business and Government Nexus: Principal Elements 
and Dynamics of the Canadian Forest Policy Regime, in CANADIAN FOREST POLICY, supra note 96, at 
23, 36–37. 
98 Id. at 37. 
99 Steven Bernstein & Benjamin Cashore, The International-Domestic Nexus: The Effects of 
International Trade and Environmental Politics on the Canadian Forest Sector, in CANADIAN FOREST 
POLICY, supra note 96, at 65, 85. 
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of international agreements
100
 and has resulted in “constant tensions 
between the provinces and the federal government over sharing of power” 
over forests.
101
  It appears that the presence of explicit constitutional 
provisions regarding forests actually causes federalism to be far more of a 
problem in the forest context than in the context of other types of resource 
management, such as fisheries and agriculture.  In those areas, the federal 
and provincial governments have resolved management conflicts with 
“cooperative federalism” arrangements, whereby political and fiscal 
pressures by the national government achieved provincial compliance with 
national policy
102—an approach that might better be called uncooperative 
federalism.  These results have yet to be achieved regarding forest 
management, even though scholars have argued that similar avenues exist 
for greater federal involvement in non-federal forest policy.
103
 
Ultimately, the lack of national constitutional primacy (element 1) 
adversely impacts not only the Canadian federal government’s ability to 
formulate a national forest policy, but also the interplay between Canadian 
federalism and international agreements concerning forests, since the 
Canadian national government is constrained by provincially reserved 
powers in exercising its treaty power.
104
  Limitations on the Canadian 
treaty power became Canadian constitutional precedent in the Labor 
Conventions case,
105
 where the Privy Council established that the Canadian 
federal government does not have the authority to implement treaties via 
enacting legislation that interferes with matters constitutionally reserved to 
the provinces.  In other words, “in Canada, the federal government lacks 
legislative competence to implement treaties whose subject matter falls 
within provincial jurisdiction”106—a constitutional state of affairs similar to 
the situation in the United States, if not more problematic.  The U.S. 
Supreme Court’s narrow ruling in Missouri v. Holland did not give such 
definitive treatment to the question of the relationship between the treaty 
power and federalism principles,
107
 and it remains to be seen whether the 
U.S. Congress has the power, pursuant to an international treaty, to intrude 
upon the regulatory role of the states over subnational forest policy. 
                                                                                                                          
100 Howlett, supra note 90, at 268. 
101 Gregersen, supra note 4, at 37.  
102 Kibel, supra note 83, at 250. 
103 Id. at 249. 
104 Bradley, supra note 3, at 456. 
105 Canada (Att’y Gen.) v. Ontario (Att’y Gen.), [1937] 1 D.L.R. 673 (Can.). 
106 Jeffrey L. Friesen, The Distribution of Treaty-Implementing Powers in Constitutional 
Federations: Thoughts on the American and Canadian Models, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1415, 1416 (1994).  
This state of affairs arises from the Labor Conventions case where the Privy Council established that 
the Canadian federal government may not implement treaties via implementing legislation that intrudes 
into matters constitutionally reserved to the provinces.  Canada (Att’y Gen.) v. Ontario (Att’y Gen.), 
[1937] 1 D.L.R. 673 (Can.). 
107 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 431–35 (1920). 
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The explicit constitutional grant of regulatory authority over forests to 
the provinces, coupled with the fact that Canadian courts have definitively 
declared the treaty power to be restricted by reserved provincial powers, 
makes it clear that Canada is currently even more restricted in international 
negotiations regarding forests than the United States.  Indeed, “[w]hile the 
United States Constitution actually contemplates a system that values the 
importance of the nation’s being able to implement its treaties, the 
Canadian constitutional framework appears to subordinate international 
concerns to domestic separation of legislative competence.”108  
Furthermore, and unlike U.S. courts, “Canadian courts have consistently 
extended rather than diminished provincial power.”109 
This review demonstrates that the Canadian national government, 
though maintaining institutional enforcement capacity (element 3) as a 
general matter,
110
 currently does not maintain constitutional primacy over 
forest management (element 1).  As a result, the government necessarily 
cannot maintain any resulting national sharing of constitutional forest 
policy authority (element 2).  Thus, subnational constitutional primacy 
over forests, combined with the vast subnational ownership of forests, 
constrains the national government from utilizing certain forms of global 
forest governance to address climate change—a constraint equal to, if not 
greater than, that placed on the U.S. federal government by the states. 
Ultimately, the U.S. and Canadian federal systems’ lack of the 
necessary elements required to fully balance global governance of forests 
with effective decentralized forest policy must be addressed.  Mechanisms 
for doing so are discussed in Part IV.  First, however, Part III explains that 
even though the U.S. and Canadian brands of federalism impact global 
governance of forests in similar ways, their respective subnationally-
established domestic forest policy frameworks are quite different—a 
difference driven largely by the fact that subnational governments own a 
vast majority of forests in Canada, whereas private property owners 
maintain control over a majority of forests in the United States.  These 
differences, combined with the distinct constitutional structure of each 
country in the context of forest policy, give rise to contrasting 
recommended approaches in Part IV for forging Fail-safe Federalism in the 
event that subnational governments do not address the increasing threats to 
domestic forests and the international community seeks to aggressively 
                                                                                                                          
108 Friesen, supra note 106, at 1433. 
109 Id. at 1439.  Additionally, “proposed constitutional amendments, particularly since 1982, have 
uniformly sought to vest more power in the provinces at the expense of the central government.”  Id.  
110 The World Justice Project Rule of Law Index rates Canada 11th (out of sixty-six countries 
assessed) for the absence of corruption and 13th (out of sixty-six countries assessed) for regulatory 
enforcement.  World Justice Project, supra note 48, at 108, 110.  Canada also has a positive score on 
the Environmental Regulatory Regimes Index developed by Yale and Columbia Universities.  
MCDERMOTT, supra note 13, at 43 fig.2.5. 
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harness domestic forestry to combat climate change via a legally binding 
international treaty. 
III.  U.S. AND CANADIAN DOMESTIC FOREST GOVERNANCE: DIVERGENT 
APPROACHES, DISPARATE IMPLICATIONS FOR FAIL-SAFE FEDERALISM 
Both the U.S. and Canadian national governments are constrained by 
subnational governments from entering into certain types of legally 
binding treaties aimed at harnessing the capacity of forests to regulate 
climate change.  Even so, each country’s domestic forest governance 
structure gives rise to important differences, which should be analyzed to 
provide a vector for the most appropriate constitutional methods of forging 
national-level fail-safes for forest management. 
As demonstrated in this Part, the main driver of these differences is the 
fact that a vast majority of Canada’s forests are provincially owned 
(seventy-seven percent)—in stark contrast to the sixty percent of U.S. 
forests that are privately owned.
111
  As a result, Canada’s subnational 
governments tend to maintain forest management standards that are both 
more consistent across the nation and more rigorous in setting minimum 
standards for a variety of forest management policies.  The provinces also 
seem to respond more readily to external demands for heightened forest 
management standards, such as those raised by environmental, scientific, 
or other members of civil society, than do U.S. state governments.  This is 
likely due to the fact that a government will more readily respond to the 
demands of civil society regarding the management of its own lands than 
the management of private lands.  In addition, the provincial electorate’s 
constituent members have no legally vested private property rights in 
public forestlands.  Rather, their interests are likely to be focused on the 
benefits that forests can provide the subnational government’s citizenry as 
a whole.  In the United States, on the other hand, where sixty percent of 
forests are privately owned, a higher proportion of civil society is made up 
of the very private forest owners who would be regulated, and who are, 
therefore, more resistant to government interference.  Ultimately, 
provincial governments are simply freer to adjust the management of their 
own policies in response to the electorate’s demands than are state 
governments in the United States.  As explained below, it is true that the 
provinces may face countervailing pressure from the forest industry, but 
provincial interaction with the “one face” of this relatively unified industry 
is a different matter altogether from U.S. state governments, who interact 
with innumerable private property owners, any one of whom may 
constitutionally challenge regulatory action as infringing on private 
property rights. 
                                                                                                                          
111 CAN. COUNSEL OF FOREST MINISTERS, supra note 26, at 4. 
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Despite the more responsive nature of provincial forest management, 
however, it remains that the Canadian federal government is more 
constitutionally restricted from asserting any measure of authority over 
forest management than is the U.S. federal government.
112
  This state of 
affairs creates a curious scenario in Canada, where—from a strictly 
domestic perspective—constitutional prescriptive (and even sometimes 
cooperative) national involvement in forest policy is exceedingly difficult 
to achieve, but it may also be less necessary from an environmental 
protection standpoint.  Canadian subnational domestic forest policy, at 
least from a statutory point of view, is simply more rigorous and of a 
higher quality across the board than that of U.S. subnational governments.  
This assertion is made from a strictly domestic perspective, because if the 
international community seeks robust mechanisms to utilize forests as 
carbon sinks to regulate carbon via a legally binding treaty, then a “good” 
Canadian forest policy today may not be viewed as “good” tomorrow.  In 
other words, Canadian forests may currently be subject to strong, 
fundamental forest management standards such as protecting riparian 
watersheds, limiting clear-cut sizes, or regulating the number and extent of 
roads built during foresting operations, but if the goal is to keep fewer trees 
from hitting the ground, then the Canadian national government remains 
limited in institutional capacity to formulate such a policy consistent with 
the needs and requirements of the global community.  Correspondingly, 
while U.S. subnational forest standards may not be as robust, the U.S. 
Constitution appears to allow more opportunity for the U.S. federal 
government to achieve inputs into subnational policy, whether those inputs 
are prescriptive or cooperative in nature.  So an understanding of U.S. and 
Canadian domestic forest policies provides insights into the most 
appropriate methods of forging Fail-safe Federalism to facilitate global 
climate governance related to forests, discussed in Part IV. 
A.  Framework for Assessing U.S. and Canadian Domestic Forest Policies 
In the first comprehensive study of its kind, McDermott et al. provided 
a framework for assessing and comparing the domestic forest policies of 
governments around the globe,
113
 identifying four “styles” of forest policy 
regulation.  The first is “procedural voluntary,” which, as the name 
suggests, encourages the voluntary development of forest management 
processes or plans, but does not require such plans to be developed.
114
  
These are contrasted with “procedural mandatory” rules, which require the 
                                                                                                                          
112 See infra notes 250–264 and accompanying text. 
113 MCDERMOTT, supra note 13, at 7–11 (discussing frameworks for comparative forest policy 
analysis). 
114 Id. at 10. 
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development of forest management plans or procedures, much as the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires environmental 
assessment reports for agency projects.
115
  Third are “substantive 
voluntary” policies, where specific forest practice guidelines exist, but they 
are not binding on forest managers.
116
  Finally “substantive prescriptive” 
rules “refer[] to mandatory, on-the-ground requirements or restrictions, 
such as a rule that no timber harvest may occur within x metres of a river 
of y width.”117  Substantive prescriptive rules are, of course, enforceable at 
law. 
McDermott et al. assessed domestic forest governance policies to 
determine which of these “styles” of forest policy regulation different 
governments maintain regarding five types of environmental protection for 
forests.  For each type of protection, the authors assigned an “indicator” 
used to classify the policy approach as one of the above “styles” of 
regulation.  The types of protection and associated indicators are as 
follows:  
1) Protection of riparian zones in forested watersheds 
(indicator: riparian streamside buffer zone rules) 
2) Protection from environmental damage caused by 
roads (indicator: rules for culvert size at stream 
crossings and road decommissioning) 
3) Protection from clearcutting damage (indicator: 
clearcut size limits or other relevant cutting rules) 
4) Reforestation (indicator: requirements for 
reforestation, including specified time frames and 
stocking levels) 
5) Limitations on annual allowable cut (indicator: cut 
limits based on sustained yield)
118
 
In addition to these five metrics, a variety of additional environmental 
protection metrics can be assessed to determine whether forests are 
managed sustainably.  The most holistic forest management approaches 
take into account metrics beyond those that maximize timber harvest and 
may include the protection of biodiversity, species habitat, ecosystems, 
                                                                                                                          
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 15–19. 
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genetic resources, and recreational and cultural values, as well as the 
provision of water purification, flood prevention, and air quality regulation 
services.
119
  The five metrics used by McDermott et al., however, are 
fundamental and reflect a baseline upon which good silvicultural practices 
may build and expand. 
Protecting riparian zones in forested watersheds prevents erosion that 
might otherwise take timberland out of production, prevents siltation of 
waterways that can lead to eutrophication, provides wildlife corridors, 
regulates water temperatures, protects aquatic habitat, and provides a 
variety of other benefits.
120
  Road building is “one of the ‘main causes [of] 
the environmental degradation of most forest regions.’”121  Roads degrade 
forests because they provide greater access for resource extraction (or 
over-extraction), cause erosion that damages watersheds, and fragment 
forested landscapes and habitat.
122
  As a result, decommissioning roads or 
limiting their location or extent is an important sustainable forest 
management objective.  Clearcutting practices can also be highly damaging 
to the environment and are “perhaps the most controversial forest 
harvesting practice[s]”—criticized by ecologists, civil society, and forest 
market scholars alike.
123
  Clearcutting is effectively a complete removal 
and replacement of the forest.  Though subsequent reforestation normally 
occurs, the removal of so much stored carbon, as well as the carbon 
sequestering potential of larger trees, has serious consequences for 
regulating greenhouse gases—not to mention the complete destruction of a 
variety of other ecological processes and habitats.
124
  Finally, reforestation 
and annual allowable cut policies are aimed at ensuring that no more of the 
resource is being harvested than is sustainable.
125
 
As can be seen in the McDermott et al. table, “Summary of 
jurisdictional approaches to all five forest practice criteria”126 (below), 
there are dramatic differences between the “styles” of riparian buffer zone, 
                                                                                                                          
119 See JAMES RASBAND ET AL., NATURAL RESOURCES LAW AND POLICY 1206–09 (2d ed. 2009); 
Bastiaan Louman et al., Forest Ecosystem Services: A Cornerstone for Human Well-Being, in 22 INT’L 
UNION OF FOREST RES. ORGS. WORLD SERIES, ADAPTATION OF FORESTS AND PEOPLE TO CLIMATE 
CHANGE—A GLOBAL ASSESSMENT REPORT 15, 16–20 (Risto Seppälä et al. eds., 2009), available at 
http://www.iufro.org/science/gfep/embargoed-release/download-by-chapter/ (follow “Download 
chapter 1” hyperlink) (last visited Dec. 16, 2011). 
120 MCDERMOTT, supra note 13, at 15. 
121 Id. at 16 (quoting Raffaele Spinelli & Enrico Marchi, A Literature Review of the 
Environmental Impacts of Forest Road Construction (1996), available at 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/X0622E/x0622e0p.htm).  
122 Id. at 16–17. 
123 Id. at 18. 
124 Carbon Sequestration in Agriculture and Forestry, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/sequestration/ 
(last visited Dec. 16, 2011). 
125 MCDERMOTT, supra note 13, at 19 20. 
126 Id. at 327 tbl.10.7. 
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road, clearcut, reforestation, and annual allowable cut forest policies 
applied by the Canadian provinces and those applied by the U.S. states.  
The chart reflects the styles of “mandatory substantive”127 in black, 
“mandatory procedural” in gray, and where the two types of mandatory are 
both used in some capacity, the chart depicts “mandatory mixed” in grid 
form.  Both styles of voluntary are represented by horizontal lines, while 
the “no policy” category is blank (white).  Different governments are 
ranked based on an average of the “style” utilized for each of the five 
indicators, with mandatory approaches landing governments nearer to “10” 
on the scale (with mandatory substantive the most stringent) and voluntary 
or no policy landing governments nearer to “0.” 
The Canadian provinces of Alberta, British Columbia, and New 
Brunswick, the U.S. state of California, and the U.S. Forest Service (which 
manages federally owned forests) each score a “9” on the scale, 
maintaining very high forest policy standards.
128
  The Canadian provinces 
of Ontario and Quebec and the U.S. state of Washington score a high “8” 
on the scale.
129
  The U.S. state of Oregon scores a “7” while Idaho scores a 
“5,” and Alaska scores a “4.”130  Lowest on the scale are the states of 
Montana with a “2.5,” Louisiana and Virginia with a “2,” and the rest of 
the southeastern United States—Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Mississippi, 
North Carolina, South Carolina, and Texas with a score of “1.”131  To put 
the southeastern U.S. states’ legal standards for forest policy in 
perspective, consider that developing countries average a “6.7” on the scale 
while nine southeastern U.S. states average a “1.2,” maintaining entirely 
voluntary “guidelines” or no standards at all.132 
                                                                                                                          
127 Id.  The chart misidentifies “mandatory substantive” as “mandatory prescriptive” in the key.   
128 MCDERMOTT, supra note 13, at 327 tbl.10.7. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
132 To be clear, “it cannot be assumed that regions with higher levels of regulation are actually 
performing better than those with lesser levels.”  Id. at 350.  A lack of institutional enforcement 
capacity and other issues of implementation may render forest standards on paper far less efficacious 
than voluntary standards in countries with better management practices on the ground.  See id. at 10 
(discussing four styles of forest policy regulation: procedural voluntary, procedural mandatory, 
substantive voluntary, and substantive prescriptive).  Yet, maintaining legal standards on paper within 
countries that respect the rule of law and do maintain institutional enforcement capacity remains 
important, as it provides some environmentally sound standards to which citizens can legally hold the 
government and their fellow citizenry accountable, even if other voluntary programs or cooperative 
arrangements are made to achieve better compliance and to take advantage of boots on the ground.  See 
id. at 342 (noting that there is a “demand for prescriptive regulations to ensure high environmental 
performance from forest managers” around the world). 
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As these rankings indicate, Canadian provinces maintain far higher and 
more consistent standards across the board than do U.S. states.  While 
some U.S. states maintain high forest management standards, others, 
particularly in the Southeast, maintain no enforceable standards at all.
133
  
                                                                                                                          
133 Id. at 327 tbl.10.7.  These lax standards have implications for other resources beyond forests 
and fail to facilitate the protection of forest habitat critical to species protection.  Indeed, there is a 
sharp contrast between the regulatory standards for forests in the Southeast and the high amount of 
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The implications of these lax standards in the southeastern United States 
for domestic forest health are profound and provide just one of the many 
compelling justifications for forging Fail-safe Federalism, not only to 
facilitate the international community’s efforts to utilize forests to mitigate 
the effects of climate change, but also for the benefit of domestic forests. 
For example, the U.S. Forest Service’s Southern Forests Futures 
Project (Futures Project)
134
 highlighted in dramatic fashion the pressure 
that southeastern U.S. forests will face over the next fifty years.  The 
project specifically focused on four factors that would “define the South’s 
future forests.
135
  These factors include: population growth, climate 
change,
136
 timber markets, and invasive species.
137
  In particular, 
“[u]rbanization is forecasted to result in forest losses, increased carbon 
emissions, and stress to other forest resources.”138  Conversion of forests to 
urban and other land uses is also expected to degrade a variety of water 
ecosystem services, including flood control and water filtration—even to 
the point of threatening public health.
139
  Population growth in the 
Southeast would “result[] in declines in forest cover, increases in demand 
for ecosystem service[s], and restrictions that complicate the ability to 
                                                                                                                          
biodiversity in the region.  Id. at 90.  Alabama, for example—the state that “[avoids] environmental 
problems through voluntary application of preventative techniques,” id. at 82—also happens to have 
the third highest number of listed threatened or endangered species under the ESA of any state in the 
U.S., only trailing Hawaii and California, U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, SPECIES REPORTS, 
http://ecos.fws.gov/tess_public/pub/stateListingAndOccurrence.jsp (last updated October 17, 2011); 
see also MCDERMOTT, supra note 13, at 94 fig.3.5 (showing number of endangered and threatened 
animal species in Canadian provinces and U.S. states). 
134 Wear, supra note 24, at 4.  The report studied thirteen states, including: Virginia, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Tennessee, Kentucky, Mississippi, Arkansas, 
Louisiana, Oklahoma and Texas.  Id. at 4 fig.1. 
135 Id. 
136 Average annual temperatures are expected to increase in the region 2.5 to 3.5 degrees Celsius 
by 2060.  Id. at 27. 
137 Id. at 4. 
138 Id.  Since the 1970s total forest area has been stable, but this stability is a result of agricultural 
lands being reforested at the same rate that urbanization has reduced forest cover.  Id. at 15.  While 
urbanization is expected to increase at even higher rates, conversion of agricultural lands to forests is 
not expected to continue.  Id. at 31. 
139 The report notes that:  
Strong population growth and associated urbanization has increased demand for 
water and challenged water availability in several areas . . . . Conversion of 
forests to urban and other land uses has resulted in a loss of natural buffering, 
increasing water pollution loads, elevating peak flows, and reducing base flows 
in affected watersheds.  The consequences are more frequent and more severe 
flooding, lower stream flows during drought conditions, and water quality that is 
degraded—sometimes to the point of threatening public health. . . . [T]he link 
between conversion of forest land to urban uses and degraded water quality in 
affected watersheds is well accepted. 
Wear, supra note 24, at 24. 
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manage forests for the full spectrum of uses.”140  Both population and 
economic growth have increased at higher rates in the Southeast than 
anywhere else in the United States, “with the resulting urbanization 
steadily consuming forests and other rural lands.”141  The Futures Project 
estimates that thirty to forty-three million acres of southern land will 
succumb to urban development by 2060, with total forest losses projected 
to be as high as twenty-three million acres, or approximately thirteen 
percent of all forestland in the south
142—an amount equal to nearly all the 
forest acreage in the states of Georgia or Alabama.
143
  The negative 
impacts of these forecasts go beyond pure environmental concerns, as the 
timber production sector in the South contributed more than one million 
jobs and fifty-one billion dollars in employee compensation in 2009.
144
  
Indeed, “southern forests are the most intensively managed forests in the 
U.S.,”145 and a majority of the United States’ lumber is harvested from 
southern forests.
146
  Remarkably, “since 1986, if the South were compared 
with any other country, none would produce more timber than this one 
region of the United States.”147 
As noted above, in the context of climate change, urbanization of the 
south is expected to have direct negative impacts on the carbon storage 
capacity of southern forests.
148
  The amount of carbon fixed in southern 
forests and their soils is projected to reach a maximum in 2020,
149
 and then 
decline by as much as five percent by 2060.
150
  This “potential decline in 
carbon storage would be a challenge for carbon mitigation policies, 
presenting a dynamic baseline where a first order policy objective would 
be to stabilize rather than expand forest carbon stocks.”151  In other words, 
even if climate change mitigation policies related to forest management 
could be enacted by subnational governments, they would not only be 
unable to sequester additional amounts of carbon to combat climate 
                                                                                                                          
140 Id. at 26 fig.2.  From 1970 to 2010, population in the South grew by eighty-eight percent, and 
disposable personal income more than doubled.  Id. at 6.  Further, from 1990 to 2008, population in the 
South grew at a rate approximately one-third faster than the nation as a whole.  Id. at 71.  These 
pressures do not appear to show any sign of letting up.  Population in the South is expected to grow yet 
another forty to sixty percent from 2010 to 2060.  Id. at 12 13. 
141 Id. at 5. 
142 Id. at 35. 
143 Id. at 31. 
144 Id. at 17. 
145 Id. at 29. 
146 Id. at 5. 
147 Id. at 17. 
148 Id. at 34. 
149 Id. 
150 Robert Hugget et al., Forecasts of Forest Conditions, in THE SOUTHERN FOREST FUTURES 
PROJECT, TECHNICAL REPORT 17 (2011), available at http://www.srs.fs.usda.gov/futures/reports/ 
draft/Frame.htm (follow “Chapter 5” hyperlink). 
151 Wear, supra note 24, at 34 (emphasis added). 
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change, but it would be exceedingly difficult to prevent forest carbon 
stocks from dropping even further.  Furthermore, given the completely 
voluntary nature of most southern forest management standards—
standards that should be completely fundamental to good forestry 
practices—it is hard to imagine prescriptive climate mitigation policies 
even being put into place by southeastern states in the near future, much 
less being successful.  The success of such policies would be undermined 
because countervailing land use policies facilitating rapid urbanization are 
also widespread.
152
 
The low forest management standards found in southeastern states 
arise directly out of the current lack of national constitutional authority to 
coordinate subnational forest policy, in conjunction with the southeastern 
United States’ governance philosophy regarding forests and land use and 
the high amount of forests privately owned in the Southeast.  Alabama’s 
perspective on voluntary “best management practices” is emblematic of 
this governance philosophy.
153
  As McDermott et al. have recently 
highlighted, the Alabama Forestry Commission declares that it is the “lead 
agency for forestry in Alabama” but that it is “not an environmental 
regulatory or enforcement agency” and that it “[avoids] environmental 
problems through voluntary application of preventative techniques.”154  
Yet when given the choice between preserving a forest, or managing it for 
the full range of ecological values, and cutting it down in the name of 
economic development and urbanization, voluntary choices do not lead to 
“preventative techniques” that benefit forests, as evidenced by rapid urban 
sprawl in the southeastern United States and the Forest Service’s projected 
loss of up to thirteen percent of the region’s forests over the next fifty 
years.
155
  Even so, most administrative agencies in the region operate 
similarly, as “[t]he implementation of BMPs [Best Management 
Practices] . . . generally involves agencies not directly responsible for 
environmental regulation.”156 
In short, the case of southeastern U.S. forest policy demonstrates the 
dramatic differences between U.S. and Canadian domestic legal standards 
for forest management, as well as the implications for failing to achieve 
greater federal inputs into subnational forest policy via Fail-safe 
Federalism.  The next section provides hypotheses aimed at explaining the 
differences between U.S. and Canadian forest policy, providing a 
foundation for Part IV’s exploration of how the nuances in federal 
structure and forest ownership in the United States and Canada give rise to 
                                                                                                                          
152 Hudson, supra note 29 (manuscript at 29). 
153 MCDERMOTT, supra note 13, at 82. 
154 Id. 
155 Wear, supra note 24, at 35. 
156 MCDERMOTT, supra note 13, at 82. 
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different suggested mechanisms for forging Fail-safe Federalism that 
strengthens not only domestic forest policy but also the ability of the 
international community to effectively utilize binding treaties to combat 
climate change. 
B.  Explaining the United States-Canada Forest Policy Gap: Private vs. 
Public Forest Ownership 
Ultimately, the gap between Canadian provincial forest policy—the 
uniformity of which somewhat approximates a national forest policy 
(though one driven solely by subnational interests)—and the widely 
divergent forest policies of the U.S. states is in large part explained by the 
respective splits in forest ownership in the two countries.  As described 
below, in Canada the vast majority of forests are provincially owned, 
which facilitates greater uniformity, stringency, and adaptability of 
Canadian provincial forest policy.  In contrast, the majority private 
ownership of U.S. forests thwarts uniformity across, as well as stringency 
and adaptability among, U.S. states.  A variety of domestic governance 
nuances arise out of the private versus public forest ownership split in the 
United States and Canada, driving distinctions in subnational forest policy 
in the respective nations.  For example, the nature of forest industry 
leaseholds in Canada is a key driver of the uniformity across provincial 
jurisdictions.  In addition, a more stable regulatory environment in Canada, 
as well as a public forest management “spillover effect” in the western 
United States not seen in eastern states, each feed into the stringency of 
subnational forest policy in the two countries, as well as into the 
adaptability of subnational governments to respond to needed changes in 
forest policy. 
1.  A Formula for Uniformity: The Canadian Private-
Industry/Provincial Interface as Quasi-corporatist Negotiations 
The relative uniformity of high forest policy standards across 
subnational governments in Canada is a result of a fairly basic formula—a 
handful of provincial governments are negotiating with a relatively 
uniform industrial base for the management and extraction of forest 
resources.  The Canadian forest sector is governed by eleven major 
provincial jurisdictions and historically has been Canada’s largest industry 
and employer.
157
  Due to seventy-seven percent of Canadian forests being 
owned by the provinces, scholars describe the current Canadian forest 
policy regime as one of “public forest management for private timber 
harvesting.”158  The Canadian provinces allocate harvesting rights on 
                                                                                                                          
157 Howlett, supra note 96, at 3. 
158 Id. at 8. 
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government-owned forests through large-scale, long-term licenses.
159
  
These licenses require the development of management plans that “align 
with strategic regional land use plans overseen by the province.”160 
Even though Canadian forest policy is extremely decentralized with 
complete, independent control maintained by each province, similar 
management challenges in the forest sector have led to “similar legislative 
and regulatory responses across the country,”161 a result of the 
corresponding uniformity and small number of forest owners controlling a 
vast majority of forests (the eleven provinces), as well as the uniformity of 
the industrial profession operating on provincially owned forests.  Forest 
industry professionals, though spread across various jurisdictions, “brought 
with them similar approaches to and ideas about appropriate solutions to 
common forest policy problems.”162  Consequently, there is a measure of 
continuity and a resulting institutional inertia for both the regulator/owner 
of the forests and the parties being regulated/using the forests, leading to a 
“tendency towards enacting similar policies in different jurisdictions.”163  
These similar policies have led to “extensive management responsibilities” 
and “increasingly intensive government regulation of company harvesting 
practices” to both ensure timber supply and protect other environmental 
values of forests.
164
  Because of the intertwined nature of the regulator and 
the regulated, the process by which forest policy is formulated in Canada is 
typically one of private negotiation in a “quasi-corporatist” style, whereby 
the government readily establishes prescriptions for forest management, 
but with input from the regulated industry.
165
  Though this negotiative 
process might give rise to concerns of a type of institutionalized agency 
capture, and though some have been critical of the industry’s maintenance 
of “a strong bargaining position,”166 vast government ownership of forests 
actually gives the provinces “a special place over and above the usual roles 
available to a legitimate government”167 in directing forest policy standards 
in the face of industrial inputs. 
The symbiotic relationship between the Canadian provinces and the 
forest industry also relieves provincial administrative burdens by providing 
a direct line of technical and professional forest management expertise.
168
  
Indeed, as administration of forest policies has become increasingly 
                                                                                                                          
159 MCDERMOTT, supra note 13, at 76. 
160 Id. 
161 Howlett, supra note 97, at 30. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. at 31. 
165 Id. at 32. 
166 Id. at 33, 43. 
167 Id. at 32–33. 
168 Id. at 33. 
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burdensome, the provincial governments have moved toward including 
basic forest management standards in the terms of timber licenses, which 
has caused “a gradual shift of responsibilities from overworked provincial 
forestry services to large corporations with their own professional forest 
staff.”169  Though this does give rise to concerns about the monitoring of 
licensees to ensure compliance, at the very least the standards are in 
place.
170
  In addition, in recent years academics and consultants acceptable 
to environmental groups have become integrated into forest policy design 
committees, whereas in the past only industry and the provinces were 
represented at the negotiating table.
171
  Furthermore, where once 
“carrot[s]” were the preferred mechanism for attempts at achieving 
compliance, increased use of fines and stronger mechanisms of 
enforcement demonstrate that “the regulatory ‘stick’ has been wielded 
more frequently.”172 
Though the quasi-corporatist nature of the Canadian forest policy 
framework certainly leaves much to be desired regarding the protection of 
the full suite of forest resources and ecosystem services
173—especially the 
carbon sequestration value of forests—at a minimum it has helped forge 
fundamental, fairly uniform, and legally enforceable forest management 
standards across the Canadian provinces.  This scenario is very much 
unlike the situation in the United States, where major industrial players are 
largely not negotiating with the government regarding the extraction of the 
government’s own resources (except, of course, on federal and state-owned 
forestlands).  Rather, those industries and a vast array of non-industrial 
private forest owners are managing their own private lands, oftentimes 
without any inputs from governments hesitant to place restrictions on 
                                                                                                                          
169 Id. at 42–43. 
170 Id. at 43. 
171 Id. at 50. 
172 Id. 
173 Scholars argue that “[t]he industrial-governmental interests constitute the principal promoters 
and users of Crown lands, and their dual goal is to extract as much fibre from the forest as possible 
while viewing other forest uses as mere constraints on extraction.”  Jamie Lawson et al., ‘Perpetual 
Revenues and the Delights of the Primitive’: Change, Continuity, and Forest Policy Regimes in 
Ontario, in CANADIAN FOREST POLICY, supra note 96, at 279, 281.  In other words, a focus on timber 
production detracts from standards protecting the full value of forests in the form of biodiversity, 
ecosystem services, recreational, and—most important for climate negotiations—carbon sequestration 
values.  Rather, these robust standards are the very basics of responsible timber harvesting.  Climate 
change regulation is perhaps the quintessential ecosystem service provided by forests, and the 
facilitation of this service would require perhaps the strictest forest management standard of all to be 
implemented on at least some portion of a nation’s forests—that timber simply not be harvested at all 
on, at least, some lands.  Others have noted that Canadian forest companies benefit a great deal from 
the international trade in their products, they have been reluctant to commit to tough environmental 
standards posed internationally and Canada as a whole has been “as protective of its own sovereignty 
as are developing countries when it comes to binding commitments at home.”  Bernstein, supra note 
99, at 74. 
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private property rights.  Thus, each state government in the United States 
manages, or fails to manage, forest practices in their own way—setting the 
stage for a tragedy of the commons in the forest policy arena, as state 
governments maximize their own citizens’ use of forest resources in their 
jurisdictions to the detriment of a forest base defined more broadly by 
national boundaries and that takes into account the value of forests across 
and beyond subnational boundaries.
174
  The large number of private 
property owners hamstrings the formulation of higher forest management 
standards, while the forest policy disparity across U.S. state jurisdictions 
makes anything resembling a national forest policy simply non-existent.  
As a result, it is also important to understand the nuances of the public-
private forest ownership divide in Canada and the United States that give 
rise to different levels of stringency and adaptability among subnational 
governments in the two countries. 
2.  A Formula for Stringency and Adaptability: Greater Public Forest 
Ownership Leads to a More Stable Regulatory Environment and a 
Public Forest Policy “Spillover Effect” on Private Lands 
McDermott et al. found a stark difference in the stringency of policy 
prescriptions on public forestlands versus private forestlands, not only in 
the United States and Canada, but among all of the developed countries 
reviewed.  Indeed, whether forests are publicly or privately owned is a 
strong predictor of policy prescriptiveness, especially in North America, 
where “private property rights, including the requirement to compensate 
forest owners once a regulation has been deemed by the courts to infringe 
upon such rights, make it much more difficult for governments to regulate 
private rather than public forests.”175  Thus there is a marked difference in 
the stringency of forest policy on public versus private forestlands in 
Canadian provinces and U.S. states, though these differences are of far less 
consequence in Canada given the small amount of privately-owned 
forests.
176
 
Correspondingly, when governments own most of the forest resource 
base, as in Canada, they are more likely to adapt to pressure to increase the 
stringency of forest policy standards, as “[g]overnments in developed 
countries respond to pressure from environmental activists and the 
community for high forest management standards by developing high 
levels of policy prescriptiveness, and high performance thresholds, for 
                                                                                                                          
174 Hudson, supra note 29, at 3–5, 18–20. 
175 MCDERMOTT, supra note 13, at 346. 
176 Similar to the United States, Canadian forest scholars note that “[b]oth legal and political 
considerations have discouraged provincial governments from aggressively regulating private forest 
lands.”  Peter Clancy, Atlantic Canada: The Politics of Private and Public Forestry, in CANADIAN 
FOREST POLICY, supra note 96, at 205, 207. 
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public forestlands.”177  Indeed, given the provincial status as what is 
effectively a “landlord” over forest resources, “provincial governments can 
set the terms for access to Crown forest resources, impose more onerous 
restrictions on harvesting activities, and use more intrusive policy 
instruments for regulation than would be tolerated if private forest lands 
were involved”178—a situation very different than in the United States, 
where private property owners control sixty percent of forests and where 
there is a wide range of variability in subnational forest management 
policies.  Nonetheless, McDermott et al. noted that even subnational 
governments with voluntary BMPs in the southeastern United States 
maintain monitoring procedures on state-owned forestlands that are well 
developed and “subject to greater scrutiny and perhaps higher performance 
expectations”179 than are private forests, which, of course, need no 
monitoring since there are no procedural or substantive requirements with 
which to comply.  As described below, this public-private divide has many 
nuances, two of which play a role in explaining the stringency and 
adaptability gap in subnational forest management standards between the 
United States and Canada—a more stable regulatory environment in 
Canada and the public forest management “spillover effect.” 
  i.  More stable regulatory environment in Canada 
In the United States, the vast array of forest owners combined with 
fifty different state governments regulating (or not regulating) forests 
creates a very volatile regulatory environment, whereas Canada’s 
regulatory environment is far more stable.  Provincial ownership of 
Canadian forests establishes continuity and stability regarding both the 
owner of forest resources and the primary regulated entity, the commercial 
forest industry in this case.  As demonstrated in Section III.B.1’s 
discussion of Canada’s quasi-corporatist negotiations, it seems easier to 
construct and maintain similar regulatory approaches across subnational 
governments when there are relatively few forest owners (eleven 
provinces) and relatively few major industrial forest players.  This is quite 
a contrast to the United States, where private ownership not only makes 
crafting regulatory standards more difficult due to constitutional concerns 
(such as Takings claims), but also makes it harder to establish consistent, 
                                                                                                                          
177 MCDERMOTT, supra note 13, at 346.  An example arose in the United States in the context of 
biodiversity protection, but directly implicated forests—the case of the Northern Spotted Owl in the 
states of Washington and Oregon.  After the ESA was utilized to protect the owl in the early 1990’s, 
timber harvest on private lands remained relatively steady, whereas harvest on public lands dropped 
precipitously.  Id. at 92–93, 93 fig.3.4.  The government was more willing to respond with regulatory 
standard setting, was also more willing to enforce those standards on its own property than on private 
property, and was therefore able to adjust course more readily. 
178 Howlett, supra note 97, at 33. 
179 MCDERMOTT, supra note 13, at 110–11. 
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responsive forest policies due to volatility in forest ownership. 
In the southeastern United States, large commercial interests have 
rapidly divested their holdings over the last few years, resulting in smaller 
private forest properties that are “subject to new dynamic forces that 
encourage parcelization and fragmentation.”180  Commercial forest owner 
divestiture of forestland between 1998 and 2010 is “the most substantial 
transition in forest ownership of the last century,” as industry divested 
itself of nearly three-quarters of its forest holdings.
181
  Much of the land 
has ended up in the hands of real estate investment trusts, which not only 
represent a voting block whose interests are diametrically opposed to high 
forest management/preservation standards, but whose ownership also only 
exacerbates the concerns regarding urbanization and reduction of forest 
cover over the next fifty years.
182
  Indeed, the Southern Forest Futures 
Project highlighted the truism that “[p]rivate owners continue to control 
forest futures” in the southeastern United States.183 
If then, as in Canada, large commercial forest interests negotiating 
with governments owning forest resources generally leads to higher and 
more consistent forest management standards across a nation
184—due to 
economies of scale in industry expertise and interactions with government 
regulators—then increased fragmentation of ownership in the United States 
may result in further negative consequences for forest management 
practices in general, not to mention forest loss by urbanization and land 
development activities.  Indeed, eighty-six percent of southern forests are 
privately owned, and while sixty percent of privately owned forests are 100 
acres or more, fifty-nine percent of all private forest owners own less than 
nine acres of forestland.
185
  Family forest holdings in the region average 
only twenty-nine acres in size.
186
  The result is a large number of 
individuals who may choose to act “rationally” regarding the appropriation 
of forest resources, maximizing personal gain to the detriment of the 
subnational, national, and global resource base—either through poor forest 
management practices or through replacement of forest resources with 
human-made capital in the form of urbanization.
187
 
Ultimately, the Canadian provinces have a far more stable regulatory 
environment within which to operate than do U.S. states, facilitated by 
more continuity in both the entities owning most of the forest resource base 
as well as with regard to the actors being regulated.  As a result, the 
                                                                                                                          
180 Wear, supra note 24, at 58. 
181 Id. at 60, 62. 
182 Id. at 60. 
183 Id. at 4–5. 
184 See supra notes 157–74 and accompanying text. 
185 Wear, supra note 24, at 62. 
186 Id. 
187 Hudson, supra note 29, at 27–29, 35–40. 
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government may more readily adopt heightened and adaptable forest 
management standards applicable to the “known quantity” that is the 
Canadian forest industry.  Even so, and as next described, public 
ownership of forests in the United States is not without effect, as it can 
actually help “ratchet up” forest management standards on private lands, 
providing further insights into the difficulty of crafting any discernible 
national forest policy in the United States via subnational government 
volition alone.
188
 
  ii.  Southeast to Northwest Disparity Among U.S. States:  
 Public Forest Management Spillover Effect 
Notably, McDermott et al. also found that a forest management 
“spillover” effect may occur whereby heightened standards on public lands 
can lead to higher regulatory standards on nearby private lands.  This could 
be one factor explaining why more prescriptive forest regulations exist in 
western states in the United States—even on private forestlands—since 
there are far more public forests in the West than in the East.
189
  For 
example, California, Washington, Oregon, Idaho, and Alaska maintain an 
average sixty-seven percent of forests in public ownership
190
 and also 
maintain far more stringent forest policy standards for both public and 
private forests (a “6.7” average) than do states in the southeastern United 
States (a “1.2” average), where eighty-six percent of forests are privately 
owned.
191
  In other words, “[w]here there are substantial public and private 
lands within a given jurisdiction, greater regulation of public lands may, 
over time, result in increased pressures from civil society and 
environmental groups for greater regulation on private lands.”192 
In fact, the United States Forest Service’s “9” score on the forest 
policy ranking does seem to have spilled over into western forest policy in 
a way not seen in the Southeast—perhaps no surprise since ninety-two 
percent of federally owned land is located in the western United States 
whereas less than five percent is located in the South.
193
  Though this 
spillover effect is important and can improve forest policy standards on 
private lands in states with large public forest holdings, its implications for 
U.S. subnational forest policy only provides another example of the 
arguable need for national level inputs into that policy.  The southeastern 
                                                                                                                          
188 See MCDERMOTT, supra note 13, at 346–47 (discussing hypotheses that may account for 
differences in public and private forestland regulation and why and how higher prescriptions on private 
lands emerge). 
189 Id. at 346. 
190 See id. at 80 tbl.3.3. 
191 Wear, supra note 24, at 58.  The eighty-six percent of forests in the South that are privately 
owned account for almost the entire amount of timber harvested in the south.  Id. 
192 MCDERMOTT, supra note 13, at 347. 
193 Wear, supra note 24, at 71. 
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United States simply does not maintain the critical mass of publicly owned 
forests that would help facilitate a spillover effect, as again, eighty-six 
percent of forests are privately owned.  Though other factors, such as 
overall governance culture and the limited administrative capacity of 
southeastern governments, may also contribute to the region’s lax 
standards, it seems that the lack of a spillover effect further exacerbates 
continuation of the status quo. 
Indeed, in a federal system of government without a national forest 
policy, a rise in standards in one area of the country is not without 
consequence for resource management in other areas.  For example, 
heightened regulatory standards for forest management policies on U.S. 
federal lands in recent decades reduced timber harvests in western states 
while shifting demand to southern forests,
194
 no doubt in part due to a 
spillover effect of public standards on private forestlands near federal 
forests.  Timber production in the South, where federal forests are virtually 
non-existent, increased from forty percent of the national total in 1952 to 
almost sixty percent in 1996.
195
  This again reflects how policy change may 
be more readily achieved for forests owned by the government than when 
the government must regulate private property owners to achieve those 
same results. 
To be clear, this is not to say that enhanced regulatory standards on 
public lands or those “spilling over” onto private lands necessarily means 
less timber production in those jurisdictions.  Indeed, a race-to-the-bottom 
may partially explain the shift to southeastern forests as forest interests 
likely moved to an area that imposed fewer monetary and regulatory costs 
on forest operations.  In this way, sudden changes in publically owned 
forest policy can not only spill over to private forestlands in the form of 
heightened forest management standards, but can also shift resource 
extraction to another area of the country with less stringent standards.  It is 
certainly true that this market shift to southeastern forests resulted in 
increased economic growth and prosperity for the region—a region in need 
of jobs and increased revenues.  Even so, the region remains one with 
some of the weakest forest management standards in the United States, and 
indeed in the world.  It also, not coincidentally, is the region projected to 
experience potentially precipitous drops in forest cover over the next fifty 
years due to that same push toward economic growth and development.
196
  
In the end, this spillover effect demonstrates an increased likelihood of 
higher forest policy standards wherever the public forests are—and public 
forests are decidedly in short supply in the most intensively managed part 
of the United States, the southeastern United States. 
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Ultimately, the public-private forest divide in the United States and 
Canada affects the stringency and adaptability of subnational forest policy 
in the two countries, due primarily to: (1) governments being able to set 
more stringent standards on their own lands; (2) governments adapting 
more readily to pressure from civil society; and (3) a more stable 
regulatory environment and the public forest “spillover effect.”  In 
addition, the quasi-corporatist nature of Canadian forest policy gives rise to 
greater uniformity across subnational jurisdictions.  These distinctions in 
uniformity, stringency, and adaptability of subnational forest policy in the 
United States and Canada contribute to Part IV’s different suggested 
mechanisms for forging Fail-safe Federalism in the two countries.
197
 
                                                                                                                          
197 In addition, remaining constitutional nuances provide insights into suggested mechanisms for 
forging Fail-safe Federalism.  Part II already discussed a variety of constitutional nuances 
distinguishing the United States and Canada from each other on forest policy and indicating that 
Canadian forest policy is even more stringently decentralized than is U.S. forest policy.  In other words, 
the United States has more powers at the federal level that it simply has yet to utilize to test whether it 
could gain greater inputs into subnational forest policy.  Another nuance remains, however, once again 
arising out of the public-private forest ownership divide.  Though public forest ownership in Canada 
may give rise to greater levels of uniformity, stringency, and adaptability of forest policy across 
subnational governments, these public forests are almost entirely provincially owned.  In contrast, 
while private forest owners do own a majority of forests in the United States, the U.S. federal 
government retains control over a much larger proportion of forests, thirty percent, than does the 
Canadian federal government.  The push toward “ecosystem management” in the 1980s and 1990s 
demonstrates how federalism even affects different nations’ abilities to manage their respective public 
forests.  At least theoretically, ecosystem management takes into account a variety of natural resource 
protection measures when considering forest management standards, including protection of a far wider 
array of forest services than those provided by timber harvest alone.  For the thirty percent of forests 
managed by the U.S. Forest Service, ecosystem management was implemented fairly quickly because 
civil society utilized the ESA, judicially enforceable at the federal level, as a hammer for changing 
forest policy on public lands.  They did so during the spotted owl controversy of the early 1990s that 
led to dramatic shifts in forest policy on federal lands.  Due to the constitutional limitations on federal 
power discussed in earlier sections of this Article, however, Canada does not have a corollary to the 
ESA, and therefore maintains no judicially enforceable statutory standard at the federal level requiring 
the protection of species on public forests.  Howlett, supra note 97, at 47.  Indeed, “the procedural 
rights of environmentalists [in Canada] still pale in comparison to their U.S. counterparts.  
Environmentalists south of the border can directly appeal administrative decisions, and when they go to 
court, they have far more formidable tools to bring to bear” than do Canadian environmentalists.  
George Hoberg, The British Columbia Forest Practices Code: Formalization and Its Effects, in 
CANADIAN FOREST POLICY, supra note 96, at 348, 362.  So even though “ecosystem management” has 
gained a “prominent place in new legislation, policy statements, and planning manuals” in Canada, 
these decisions arise solely out of provincial initiative, rather than because of some external 
coordinating authority at the federal level.  Jeremy Wilson, Talking the Talk and Walking the Walk: 
Reflections on the Early Influence of Ecosystem Management Ideas, in CANADIAN FOREST POLICY, 
supra note 96, at 94, 94.  So ultimately, though this section has focused primarily on nuances of 
subnational forest management in the United States and Canada, U.S. citizens’ ability to harness 
procedural rights arising out of greater constitutional authority for the U.S. federal government 
provides an important insight into the types of Fail-safe Federalism that might be most effectively 
employed in the United States versus Canada. 
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C.  Implications of the Private-Public Forest Ownership Divide for 
Suggested Mechanisms of Fail-safe Federalism 
The United States and Canada are in very different positions with 
respect to fundamental forest management policies at the domestic level—
such as those related to riparian buffer zones in forested watersheds, 
forestland roads, clearcutting, reforestation, and annual allowable cut 
limits.  Canadian provinces maintain high legal standards for these types of 
policies on the vast majority of Canada’s forests.  The vast public 
ownership of Canadian forests gives rise to a great degree of uniformity 
across provincial forest policies as well as more stringent standards and the 
ability to adapt to newly recognized mechanisms for achieving sustainable 
forest management.  U.S. states, on the other hand, maintain a wide range 
of legal standards for forest management, from high standards in some 
states to standards less stringent than those in developing countries in 
southeastern states. 
Though the United States and Canada are in different positions 
domestically, they face a similar challenge internationally, as their 
constitutional structures do not currently allow significant or direct, 
national-level regulatory inputs into domestic forest policy on a majority of 
the forestland within their borders.  More specifically, these nations’ 
federal governments would be limited from participating in any forest 
preservation/carbon sequestration mandates arising out of international 
efforts to harness the power of forests to combat climate change.  For 
example, if an international treaty were to require the United States to curb 
the projected destruction of twenty-three million acres, or approximately 
thirteen percent, of all forestland in the South over the next fifty years, or 
require Canada to halt the destruction of over eleven million acres of 
boreal forest during the same time period, then these countries’ national 
governments would be unable to ensure compliance.  It would be up to 
individual states and provinces to preserve those forestlands.  Yet these 
subnational governments face incentives diametrically opposed to 
preserving their forests in the form of urbanization driven by economic 
development and growth. 
As a result, the U.S. and Canadian national governments need to work 
with subnational governments to develop fail-safes for their particular 
forms of federalism that trigger in the absence of subnational climate 
policies related to forests, if they are to effectively participate in the full 
suite of options available to the international community to effectively 
address climate change.  In Canada, such fail-safes are needed mostly to 
allow the Canadian national government greater flexibility in participating 
in international negotiations related to climate change and forests, though 
clearly the national government may also need to develop inputs into 
domestic forest policy to curb projected losses of provincial forests due to 
urban sprawl and agricultural growth.  The United States, on the other 
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hand, needs a fail-safe not only to allow greater flexibility in international 
negotiations, but perhaps more fundamentally to improve the overall 
quality of the highly variable and often inadequate domestic subnational 
forest management standards in the United States.  So the United States’ 
need for a federal fail-safe operates on both the domestic and international 
planes. 
Based upon the above review, however, different mechanisms for 
developing federal fail-safes may be more appropriate as between the two 
countries.  The vast public forest ownership in Canada, the far more 
limited constitutional power at the federal level, and the resulting 
limitations on civil society’s procedural rights at the federal level198 render 
a federal fail-safe in Canada far more likely to arise out of transnational 
pressures from civil society, discussed in Section IV.D.  Correspondingly, 
the greater constitutional powers afforded the United States federal 
government as a general matter and the greater amount of forests in federal 
ownership in the United States
199
 make forging Fail-safe Federalism out of 
constitutionally validated top-down and bilateral mechanisms, or by 
horizontal arrangements among the states, far more efficacious, as 
discussed in Sections IV.A.–C. 
IV.  FORGING FAIL-SAFE FEDERALISM BY FORTIFYING KEYSTONE 
CONSTITUTIONS 
A variety of mechanisms are available to the U.S. and Canadian 
governments for adjusting their respective constitutional structures to allow 
a national government fail-safe in the event subnational governments fail 
to act on forests and climate change.
200
  These mechanisms are aimed at 
                                                                                                                          
198 See supra note 197 and accompanying text. 
199 Id. 
200 A point of clarification should be made regarding the suggested mechanisms of forging Fail-
safe Federalism discussed in this Part.  Specifically regarding the United States, the analysis of these 
mechanisms is undertaken in the context of a recently developed theory of “Bimodal Federalism.”  See 
Blake Hudson, Reconstituting Land-Use Federalism to Address Transitory and Perpetual Disasters: 
The Bimodal Federalism Framework, 2011 BYU L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 31).  
There is currently a disconnect in the scholarly literature about how U.S. federalism in fact operates or 
should normatively operate regarding certain regulatory subject matter and how it actually operates 
regarding other subject matter.  This disconnect is illustrated by the two different modes of federalism 
in operation in the United States today: “dynamic federalism” and “dual federalism.”  Theories of dual 
federalism posit that “the states and federal government inhabit[] mutually exclusive spheres of 
power.”  Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law, 56 
EMORY L.J. 159, 175 (2006).  On the other hand, theories of dynamic federalism “reject[] any 
conception of federalism that separates federal and state authority under the dualist notion that the 
states need a sphere of authority protected from the influence of the federal government” and posits that 
“federal and state governments function as alternative centers of power and any matter is 
presumptively within the authority of both the federal and the state governments.”  Id. at 176 (emphasis 
added).  Yet, neither of these theories alone provides an accurate descriptive picture of the actual 
operation of U.S. federalism today.  While dynamic federalism might be the status quo on many 
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fortifying the “keystone constitutions”201 guiding these federal systems.  
All federal systems maintain written constitutions from which the legal 
authority to govern emanates.
202
  These constitutions provide governance 
stability on many levels, and “stability is protected in many nations, 
especially those with federal structures, by a special status for the 
constitution that makes it of a higher order than other laws and subject to 
more rigid rules for change than any statute.  A constitution should not be 
easy to change . . . .”203 
Even though the difficulty of amending constitutions is important for 
providing stability in the social construct of governance, when stability 
becomes rigidity in the face of a changing environment and the resultant 
changing needs of society, reassessment of constitutional structure is 
warranted.
204
  This is especially the case when society also depends upon 
the stability of non-social constructs for its success, such as the “natural” 
construct of a stable environment—stability that is the antithesis of an 
abruptly changing climate.  In this way, keystone constitutions in federal 
governments lie at the very center of an arch of resource governance.
205
  In 
this arch, one can conceptualize one column as subnational resource 
governance and the other column as global resource governance.  National 
                                                                                                                          
regulatory subject matters, remnants of dual federalism remain.  Direct land use regulatory authority, 
including private forest management, is one such remnant, as the federal and state governments do 
operate as if there are separate spheres of governance.  As a result, the federal government is perceived 
as having no constitutional authority to direct subnational land use planning.  To the extent that 
remnant dualist notions remain in the United States the remainder of this Article assesses which types 
of legislative mechanisms most readily provide viable policy responses, including an assessment of the 
constitutional viability of those responses.  In doing so, it borrows arguably relic-like terminology of 
previous theories of federalism such as “top-down,” “bilateral,” and “horizontal.”  These terms must be 
utilized because regarding subject matter where dualist notions remain, like subnational forest 
management, there may be no top-down federal regulatory approach available, leading to the need to 
explore other approaches.  Consistent with dynamic federalism theory, however, these mechanisms 
may be operating simultaneously at all levels of governance.  The dynamic-dual federalism debate is a 
moot point in the context of Canadian forestry because dual federalist notions are explicitly delineated 
in the Canadian Constitution.  In other words, whereas the arguable scope of U.S. Commerce Clause 
authority facilitates a dual versus dynamic federalism debate for subnational forest management, the 
explicit constitutional grant of authority over subnational forest policy to the provinces in Canada 
makes dual federalism the unequivocal constitutional status quo.  So the discussions of top-down, 
bilateral, and horizontal in this Part are especially warranted in the Canadian context. 
201 See generally Hudson, supra note 29. 
202 See Martin Edelman, Written Constitutions, Democracy and Judicial Interpretation: The 
Hobgoblin of Judicial Activism, 68 ALB. L. REV. 585, 587 (2005) (discussing the importance of a 
constitution for the purposes of regulating the state and laying the framework for governmental power). 
203 Katherine Swinton, Amending the Canadian Constitution: Lessons From Meech Lake, 42 U. 
TORONTO L.J. 139, 145 (1992). 
204 This reassessment of constitutional structure focuses on the institutional capacity of a 
government to formulate policy, separate and apart from considerations of political will, and occurs 
within a new theoretical framework of policy success first presented in Hudson, Federal Constitutions, 
supra note 2  (manuscript at 59). 
205 Hudson, supra note 29, at 3 fig.1. 
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resource governance is at the top of the arch.  The constitution in federal 
systems acts as a keystone in this arch, providing the governance 
framework that dictates the rules for resource management on both the 
subnational and global levels.  If these keystone constitutions allow 
national level inputs into resource management on subnational scales, 
which in turn allows unfettered national involvement in resource 
management on global scales, then they maintain a strong arch of resource 
governance, the integrity of which is stable and adequately addresses 
resource management across scales.  If keystone constitutions do not allow 
national level inputs into subnational resource management, and 
consequently allow subnational governments to constrain national 
involvement in global resource governance—as with forest management in 
the United States and Canada—then they contribute to a weak and 
vulnerable arch of resource governance that is likely to crumble due to the 
legal entrenchment of a resource commons not only within national 
boundaries but also internationally.
206
 
As a result, fortification of the U.S. and Canadian constitutional 
structures is needed in the context of forestry and climate change.  As 
discussed in Section A, some of the mechanisms for doing so arise directly 
out of national or subnational initiative and utilize existing constitutional 
processes.  Other mechanisms, as discussed in Section B, arise from 
pressures civil society places on governments to take action.  Certain of 
these mechanisms are more viable in the United States than in Canada, and 
vice versa—a circumstance driven largely by the earlier explored 
differences in domestic constitutional structure and the split of forest 
ownership in the two countries. 
A.  Fortification From Within: Top-Down, Bilateral, and Horizontal 
Governance 
1.  Top-down 
The first mechanism for forging Fail-safe Federalism is a “top-down” 
approach, whereby the national government in a federal system attempts to 
use its current constitutional powers to gain legal inputs into subnational 
forest policy.
207
  The top-down approach would either require a direct 
amendment to a country’s constitution allowing the national government 
constitutional authority, or it would necessitate expanded judicial 
                                                                                                                          
206 Id. at 6. 
207 The structure of Section IV.A, as well as related concepts of top-down, bilateral, and 
horizontal approaches to adjusting the federal state balance of constitutional federalism, was presented 
in Hudson, supra note 200, at 28–29, though that analysis focused only on the U.S. Constitution and 
was within the context of land use planning related to disaster prevention and mitigation rather than 
forestry. 
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interpretation of current constitutional provisions granting the national 
government such authority. 
  i.  Constitutional Amendment 
A variety of scholars have assessed both the need for, and the 
effectiveness of, amending the U.S. Constitution to either provide citizens 
a fundamental constitutional right to environmental protection or to allow 
the federal government to constitutionally regulate the environment with 
greater scope than it currently employs.
208
  Far less has been written about 
the viability of amending the Canadian Constitution, primarily for two 
reasons, discussed in greater detail below.  First, Canada’s ability to amend 
its own constitution only recently became a reality, as Great Britain 
granted exclusive amendment rights to the Canadian government only 
thirty years ago.
209
  One consequence is that Canada’s procedures for 
amending its constitution are arguably unsettled, with some scholars 
raising doubts about their efficacy.
210
  Second, and related to the amending 
procedures themselves, amending the Canadian Constitution in a way that 
ensures provincial adherence is exceedingly difficult and is so unlikely in 
areas of explicit constitutional grants of exclusive provincial regulatory 
authority that scholars have simply ignored the question in the forest 
management context.  Ultimately, for the reasons discussed below, this 
mechanism of forging a fail-safe on forest policy is not the most viable in 
either the United States or Canada. 
There have been over ten thousand proposed amendments to the 
United States Constitution,
211
 and only a few have passed—no doubt due to 
                                                                                                                          
208 See Robin Kundis Craig, Should There Be a Constitutional Right to a Clean/Healthy 
Environment?, 34 ENVTL. L. REP. 11013, 11014 (2004) (questioning the effectiveness of courts taking 
on environmental issues in the absence of a constitutional amendment); Dan L. Gildor, Preserving The 
Priceless: A Constitutional Amendment to Empower Congress to Preserve, Protect, and Promote The 
Environment, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 821, 846–47 (2005) (advocating amending the Constitution to promote 
environmental goals); Rodger Schlickeisen, Protecting Biodiversity for Future Generations: An 
Argument for a Constitutional Amendment, 8 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 181, 206 (1994) (“Only an 
amendment . . . will be able to resolve all doubt about the standing of a citizen to enjoin government 
actions that endanger those resources.”); Pamela B. Schmaltz, Is It Time for an Environmental 
Amendment?, 38 LOY. L. REV. 451, 461–62 (1992) (discussing the ineffectiveness of statutory 
environmental initiatives).  But see J.B. Ruhl, The Metrics of Constitutional Amendments: And Why 
Proposed Environmental Quality Amendments Don’t Measure Up, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245, 250–
51 (1999) (arguing that environmentally focused constitutional amendments have been ineffective). 
209 William C. Hodge, Patriation of the Canadian Constitution: Comparative Federalism in a 
New Context, 60 WASH. L. REV. 585, 585 (1985). 
210 See, e.g., Sujit Choudhry, Ackerman’s Higher Lawmaking in Comparative Constitutional 
Perspective: Constitutional Moments as Constitutional Failures?, 6 INT’L J. OF CONST. L. 193, 225 
(2008) (describing the amendment procedure as a “failure”). 
211 See RICHARD B. BERNSTEIN & JEROME AGEL, AMENDING AMERICA: IF WE LOVE THE 
CONSTITUTION SO MUCH, WHY DO WE KEEP TRYING TO CHANGE IT? 169 (1993) (discussing the 
likelihood of an amendment to the United States Constitution being ratified); JOHN R. VILE, 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, AND AMENDING 
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the difficulties of passing an amendment via the Article V process.
212
  J.B. 
Ruhl has provided an analytical tool for assessing the efficacy and 
desirability of amending the U.S. Constitution with an “environmental 
quality amendment” (EQA).  The calls for such an amendment have been 
on the rise in recent decades.
213
  Proposed EQAs tend to be aspirational and 
generalized, as Ruhl describes, including language such as: “[t]he natural 
resources of the nation are the heritage of present and future generations.  
The right of each person to clean and healthful air and water, and to the 
protection of other natural resources of the nation, shall not be infringed by 
any person.”214 
Ruhl developed a matrix to assess the viability of proposed 
constitutional amendments along two axes: a function axis and a target 
axis.  The function axis describes the institutional purpose of the 
amendment, such as whether it: (1) alters the operational rules of 
government; (2) prohibits specified government action; (3) creates or 
affirms individual rights; or (4) expresses aspirational goals.
215
  The target 
axis describes the societal interaction adjusted by the functional change, 
such as: (1) intra- and intergovernmental relations; (2) relations between 
the government and its citizens; or (3) relations between citizens.
216
  EQAs 
tend to fall into a category that no existing amendment to the Constitution 
does—that of an amendment establishing aspirational goals (function 4) 
for citizen-citizen relations (target 3).  Ruhl believes the Constitution is not 
meant to include these types of aspirational dictates,
217
 largely because 
they must necessarily be drafted either ambiguously or so narrowly as to 
make implementation nearly impossible. 
The amendment that would allow U.S. federal government inputs into 
subnational forest policy,
218
 however, would fall into a category far more 
likely to be efficacious according to Ruhl’s matrix, assuming it could be 
passed in the first instance.  Such an amendment might simply declare: 
“The federal government of the United States maintains the authority to 
regulate the management of the nation’s forest resources; federally-owned, 
                                                                                                                          
ISSUES, 1789–1995, xi, 363–80 (1996) (collating proposals by year); Ruth B. Ginsburg, On Amending 
the Constitution: A Plea for Patience, 12 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 677, 679 (1990). 
212 An amendment must be proposed by either two-thirds of both houses or two-thirds of state 
governments and ratified by three-quarters of state governments.  U.S. CONST. art. V. 
213 Ruhl, supra note 208, at 248–49. 
214 Id. at 248. 
215 Id. at 253. 
216 Id. 
217 Ruhl states that “any EQA attempting to capture a normative statement about the environment 
and plug it into the United States Constitution is simply a bad idea.”  Id. at 252.  Furthermore, 
“amendments purporting to express aspirational values or regulate civil relations, or do both, should set 
off bells and whistles in the political evaluation process.”  Id. at 260. 
218 The same would also be true for an amendment that sought to allow federal involvement in 
land use policy-making generally. 
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state-owned, and privately-owned.”  This amendment would function to 
alter the operational rules of government (function 1) in order to adjust the 
target of intergovernmental relations (target 1).  In fact, nine amendments 
currently fall under this category of the matrix.
219
  If United States federal 
and subnational governments one day agreed to change the operational 
rules of government and the current status of intergovernmental relations 
by rebalancing federal-state roles in regulating forest management via 
amendment, it would fall into the category described by Ruhl as far more 
likely to be viable than aspirational/citizen-citizen relation amendments.  
Furthermore, though the legislative process is preferable to constitutional 
amendment a vast majority of the time, lest the constitution become diluted 
and take the form of a legislative instrument, society may be unable to 
achieve some policies in the absence of an amendment.
220
  Ruhl argues 
that:  
The question of need, therefore, is whether there is any 
institutional barrier to fulfilling the fundamental, widely 
accepted social policy through routine legislative and 
judicial forums. . . . [S]ome amendments have forced an 
intransigent minority of states to come into line with the 
rest of the nation on fundamental social policy issues 
associated with matters traditionally (or constitutionally) 
left to state jurisdiction.  Where federal legislation cannot 
impose the policy over state resistance and the courts 
cannot mold the existing constitutional text to handle the 
stubborn states, an amendment is the only alternative.  
These are examples of institutional necessity, where an 
amendment, and only an amendment, can allow the widely 
accepted social policy to move forward in society.
221
 
There is arguably an institutional barrier to certain federal regulatory inputs 
into subnational forest policy—a barrier in the form of current 
understandings of U.S. constitutional law.  Furthermore, the absence of 
responsible state government management of forest resources, as 
illustrated by the current lack of management standards for the highly 
threatened forests of the southeastern United States, confirms that an 
amendment remedying exclusive state regulatory authority over 
subnational forest policy could be a last resort to overcoming that barrier 
with the most effective social policy. 
Other scholars have also argued for constitutional amendments that 
                                                                                                                          
219 Ruhl, supra note 208, at 261 fig.1. 
220 Id. at 270–71. 
221 Id. at 271. 
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rebalance the relationship between the U.S. federal government and the 
states to allow greater federal inputs into environmental policy-making in 
the absence of state action.
222
  These types of amendments would be 
“purely structural,” unlike a substantive constitutional amendment 
providing a fundamental right to a clean and healthy environment, and 
would simply “empower[] Congress to legislate regarding the 
environment”223 if it chose to do so.  In other words, nothing would compel 
the federal government to legislate pursuant to its authority nor would any 
new fundamental constitutional rights be created for U.S. citizens. 
The likelihood of an amendment being effective, however, is a 
different question from whether such an amendment is likely to be passed 
in the first place.  The U.S. Congress has never attempted to harness 
current constitutional powers to address subnational forest policy, much 
less placed a constitutional amendment on its agenda.  So even though this 
type of structural amendment may be of the kind most likely to be 
workable if enacted, and remains an option that should certainly continue 
to be studied, it remains perhaps the least viable mechanism for forging 
Fail-safe Federalism in the United States on forest policy—especially 
given the difficulty of convincing three-quarters of the states to ratify an 
amendment that intrudes on state regulatory powers and given that any 
kind of “constitutional environmental amendment is unlikely in the current 
political climate . . . .”224 
A similar state of affairs exists in Canada.  The Canadian Constitution 
has only been amended ten times since Canada officially received the 
power to amend its own constitution from the British in 1982
225—and most 
of the amendments that have been passed are province-specific.
226
  Though 
Canada has a formal amendment procedure,
227
 it was not unanimously 
agreed to by the provinces—Quebec voiced resistance to its legitimacy.228  
                                                                                                                          
222 See, e.g., Craig, supra note 208, at 11018.  Professor Craig argues that “a constitutional 
amendment could allow Congress to reenact the federal environmental statutes pursuant to that 
amendment’s grant of legislative authority, freeing them of any lingering Commerce Clause limitations 
and leaving Congress free to reach the last federally unregulated impediments to environmental 
quality—such as nonpoint source pollution—currently deemed to be outside the federal regulatory 
sphere.”  Id. at 11019–20. 
223 Gildor, supra note 208, at 823. 
224 Craig, supra note 208, at 11018. 
225 The Supreme Court of Canada held in the Patriation Reference case that the Canadian federal 
government could gain exclusive authority to amend the Canadian Constitution, though it could only 
do so with a “substantial degree” of provincial support.  The federal government was able to do so in 
December of 1981.  Kevin Sneesby, National Separation: Canada in Context-Legal Perspective, 53 
LA. L. REV. 1357, 1366 (1993). 
226 Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 (U.K.). 
227 Constitution Act, 1982, pt. V, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c .11 (U.K.) 
(requiring different procedures for different types of amendments, such as those relating to the 
composition of the Supreme Court of Canada or that are province specific). 
228 Choudhry, supra note 210, at 222. 
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In fact, the rules governing constitutional amendment in Canada have been 
described by at least one scholar as a “failure.”229  Fears regarding the 
perceived illegitimacy of these amending procedures have caused courts to 
actually ignore their interpretation, and even their existence, on some 
constitutional questions
230—lending evidence regarding not only the 
difficulty of amending the Canadian Constitution but also the legitimacy of 
such amendments in their own right. 
Even if the amending procedures are accepted as legitimate, it is 
exceedingly difficult to pass an amendment that effectively binds the 
provinces, once again demonstrating the far more robust constitutional 
decentralization presented by the Canadian brand of federalism relative to 
that in the United States.  The amending procedure that would be relevant 
to a forest policy amendment would require two-thirds of the provinces, 
including at least fifty percent of the population, to approve the 
amendment.
231
  Once passed, however, provinces may opt out merely by 
passing a resolution opposing the amendment within one year.
232
  In 
addition, an amendment fails altogether if the amendment procedures are 
not finalized within three years of the beginning of the process.
233
  Some 
have criticized this lengthy time limit as allowing ever-shifting changes in 
political will, increasing opposition, and election-driven changes in the 
provinces’ political make-up to lead to amendment failures.234  Indeed, the 
failure of one such amendment in the late 1980s was “particularly 
distressing” because at the time the proposed amendment died it “had the 
support of resolutions of the House of Commons and of eight provincial 
legislatures representing approximately ninety-four percent of the national 
population.  That an amendment could fail in such a situation, with such 
widespread support from popularly elected legislatures, does suggest a 
problem with the amending formula.”235 
Ultimately, the questions surrounding the soundness of Canada’s 
amending procedures, coupled with the fact that provinces can simply opt 
out of any amendment that sought greater federal involvement in 
subnational forest policy, renders this mechanism for forging Fail-safe 
Federalism unpromising.  In addition, the political trend in Canada 
regarding constitutional amendment has trended in the opposite direction 
from granting greater federal power, as “proposed constitutional 
amendments, particularly since 1982, have uniformly sought to vest more 
                                                                                                                          
229 Id. at 225. 
230 Id. at 227. 
231 Constitution Act, 1982, § 38(1), being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c.11 (U.K). 
232 Id. § 38(3). 
233 Id. § 38(2). 
234 See, e.g., Swinton, supra note 203, at 144–45. 
235 Id. at 145. 
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power in the provinces at the expense of the central government.”236  Not 
only would it be politically difficult to persuade the provinces to divest 
their current, explicit constitutional authority over forest policy on eighty-
four percent of Canada’s forests, but it would, potentially, also be legally 
insufficient if some provinces opted out.  This legal insufficiency would 
fail to change the status quo regarding the Canadian federal government’s 
inability to ensure that international obligations related to subnational 
forest management are met.  An amendment, however, is not the only top-
down mechanism available to the United States or Canada.  Current 
constitutional provisions may provide the respective federal governments 
authority over subnational forest policy that they have not yet claimed or 
that has not yet been validated by courts interpreting their respective 
constitutions. 
  ii.  Constitutional Interpretation 
A more viable mechanism for top-down forging of Fail-safe 
Federalism on forest policy, at least in the United States, is expanded 
interpretation of current constitutional provisions.  While the United States 
currently maintains constitutional provisions that may be well-suited for 
allowing federal inputs into subnational forest policy, Canada’s options are 
not only more limited, but as discussed above, the explicit constitutional 
grant of forest policy-making authority to the provinces makes expanded 
constitutional interpretation of federal powers virtually unattainable. 
In the United States, the Commerce Clause is the primary 
constitutional provision pursuant to which most environmental legislation 
is passed.
237
  The United States Congress could certainly pass a “Carbon 
Sequestration and Forest Management Act” that tests the waters of judicial 
interpretation regarding the scope of Congress’ authority under the 
Commerce Clause and that establishes mechanisms for utilizing forests to 
sequester carbon to combat climate change.  To that end, the act could 
establish a variety of forest management standards, such as restrictions on 
clearcutting, afforestation and reforestation requirements, annual allowable 
cut, and stand density requirements, among a variety of other standards.  If 
such an act were found constitutional, then the federal government would 
no longer be constrained by subnational governments in international 
negotiations related to climate and forests.  Even though private forest 
management has long been the constitutional purview of state 
governments, there is a distinct possibility that such an act would be found 
constitutional as part of the federal government’s suite of Commerce 
Clause powers.  The interstate markets into which timber resources directly 
                                                                                                                          
236 Friesen, supra note 106, at 1439. 
237 NICHOLAS A. ROBINSON, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION OF REAL PROPERTY § 3.02(1) 
(2011). 
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flow are quite robust.  As noted above, timber production in the South 
alone, which happens to be the region containing the highest proportion of 
private forestland subject predominantly to state jurisdiction, contributed 
more than one million jobs and $51 billion of employee compensation in 
2009.
238
  Southeastern forests are “the most intensively managed forests in 
the United States,”239 and a majority of the United States’ lumber is 
harvested from southeastern forests.
240
  Furthermore, eighty-nine percent of 
U.S. timber is harvested from private lands
241
 subject to state governments’ 
land use regulatory authority.  In other natural resource contexts, private 
lands may be reached by federal regulation of resources appropriated in a 
way that has substantial effects on interstate commerce.  A variety of 
federal statutes regulating natural resources have been upheld under this 
test,
242
 including the Endangered Species Act—held valid even for the 
regulation of entirely intrastate species with arguably tenuous connections 
to interstate commerce.
243
  How much more so, then, might a robust 
industry like the timber industry be found to substantially affect interstate 
commerce?  Unlike endangered species, after all, timber is a commodity 
that is exchanged on the open market. 
Recent research establishes a unified theory for assessing the validity 
of Congressional authority to regulate the environment, utilizing commons 
analysis to do so.
244
  Commons analysis demonstrates that the federal 
government maintains constitutional authority to regulate two categories of 
                                                                                                                          
238 Wear, supra note 24, at 17. 
239 Id. at 29. 
240 Id. at 5. 
241 U.S.D.A., U.S. FOREST FACTS AND HISTORICAL TRENDS 7 (Sept. 2001), available at 
http://fia.fs.fed.us/library/briefings-summaries-overviews/docs/ForestFactsMetric.pdf.  Carbon flux, or 
the net difference between carbon removal and carbon addition to the atmosphere, is fifty percent 
greater on public forestlands in the United States than on private forestlands, most likely resulting 
“from greater land use conversions and disturbance (including timber harvest) on private forests 
relative to public forests.”  Eric M. White and Ralph J. Alig, Public and Private Forest Ownership in 
the Context of Carbon Sequestration and Bioenergy Feedstock Production—A Briefing Paper on 
Existing Research and Research Needs 9–10 (Mar. 2010), available at http://www.fsl.orst.edu/lulcd/ 
Publicationsalpha_files/White_Public_Private_Briefing.pdf. 
242 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005) (upholding the federal regulation of marijuana); 
Hodel v. Ind., 452 U.S. 314, 326 (1981) (upholding the federal regulation of minerals); Hodel v. Va. 
Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 281 (1981) (same); United States v. 
Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121, 133 (1985) (upholding the regulation of wetlands by the 
federal government); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128–29 (1942) (upholding the federal 
regulation of wheat); see also Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapt. Comms. for Ore., 515 U.S. 687, 708 
(1995) (noting that Congress has exercised its delegated powers in crafting the Endangered Species 
Act); TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978) (stating that Congress not only has the power to create 
legislation, but also to determine the relative priority for the country). 
243 Rancho Viejo v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1158, 1158 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Sentelle, J., dissenting); id. at 
1160 (Roberts, J., dissenting). 
244 Blake Hudson, Commerce in the Commons: A Unified Theory of Natural Capital Regulation 
Under the Commerce Clause, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 375, 379 (2011). 
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environmental resources that have substantial effects on interstate 
commerce: “(1) natural resources contained on land (wetlands, endangered 
species, or other natural capital) that are appropriated by economic 
development (retail, housing, industrial, agricultural, etc.), and (2) 
resources appropriated by individuals and tied to an interstate market 
(wheat, marijuana, or other natural capital commodities).”245  Timber 
commodities clearly fall into this latter category.  Though it seems clear 
that timber production on private lands can be constitutionally regulated by 
the federal government under this second category, federal preservation of 
forests threatened by urbanization—such as the forests in the Southeast—
may even be constitutionally viable under the first category.  Any time 
commercial development replaces forest resources, there is an appropriator 
of the resource tied to interstate markets (the developer) and a resource that 
is being appropriated (the forest).  These are the constituent components of 
a commons, and it is the act of “appropriation” by the developer of the 
forest resource that substantially affects interstate commerce and that gives 
the federal government constitutional authority over resource 
management.
246
 
Either way, if the federal government sought input into subnational 
forest policy pursuant to its Commerce Clause power, there are strong 
arguments that it may do so—either to provide standards for timber 
production or to preserve forests and their corresponding carbon 
sequestration/climate change mitigation values in the face of threatening 
urbanization.  This mechanism is not without complication, however.  
While subnational forest management may more readily be considered to 
have a substantial effect on interstate commerce than, say, endangered 
species protection, it also falls more squarely within the category of a 
direct land use activity traditionally regulated by state and local 
governments. This is because regulation of endangered species may only 
indirectly impact land use activities otherwise subject to state regulatory 
authority.
247
  As a result, passage of federal private forest legislation is 
more difficult as a political matter, especially given the current political 
climate.  The federal government may perceive that it is just as limited in 
enacting private forest legislation as it would be setting growth boundaries 
around major U.S. cities, a zoning-driven mechanism of land use 
regulation currently the responsibility of the states.  Therefore, “legal 
perception becomes political reality,” as the government politically views 
its hands as tied due to perceived legal constraints.  In addition, such an 
act, even if passed, would be subject to other legal protections afforded to 
                                                                                                                          
245 Id. at 382. 
246 See id. at 423–27 (providing a “clear framework within which to analyze the ‘object’ of natural 
capital regulation”). 
247 Hudson & Weinthal, supra note 2, at 392. 
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private forest owners, such as the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause.
248
  
Even so, it certainly seems that regulation requiring a minimum level of 
carbon density on forested lands could be crafted to avoid such 
constitutional complications and could further be structured to maintain the 
benefits provided by decentralized forest governance.  Ultimately, the 
constitutionality of federal subnational forest management legislation has 
yet to be tested by the U.S. Congress or within U.S. courts—despite the 
fact that there are good arguments supporting its legitimacy.
249
  As a result, 
a top-down, expanded constitutional interpretation mechanism may be a 
viable option for forging Fail-safe Federalism on subnational forestlands in 
the United States. 
Canada, on the other hand, maintains a far less firm foundation of 
federal constitutional authority upon which to potentially expand.  As 
noted, while the Canadian Constitution grants exclusive regulatory 
authority over forest management to the provinces, Section 91 of the 
Canadian Constitution allows the national government exclusive regulatory 
authority over “trade and commerce” and residually over “peace, order and 
good government” (POGG).  The Canadian Supreme Court has construed 
these provisions as including the implementation of treaties concerning 
trade and commerce and other matters of “national concern.”250  As 
asserted in Section II.C, it would seem that climate change would affect 
both trade and commerce in Canadian forest products, and it is certainly a 
matter of national and global concern.  The Canadian national government, 
however, has not yet invoked these constitutional powers to justify the 
implementation of international climate and forest agreements.
251
 
Scholars have debated the efficacy of utilizing the trade and commerce 
and POGG clauses to allow greater federal inputs into provincial 
                                                                                                                          
248 U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 4 (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation.”). 
249 See generally Hudson, supra note 244, at 430. 
250 Kibel, supra note 83, at 248. 
251 It is true that exclusive federal power in the areas of trade, commerce, and taxation has 
“limited the thrust of provincial constitutional supremacy in many resource matters,” especially given 
the great number of natural resources that enter interprovincial or international markets.  Howlett, 
supra note 97, at 39.  This was noted above with regard to agriculture and fisheries.  See supra Section 
II.C.  Even though forest products certainly enter into those same markets, they remain separate and 
apart from these other natural resources—due primarily to the explicit nature of the constitutional forest 
mandates—and the federal government’s use of constitutional powers in the forest context has largely 
been limited to mitigating forest management impacts on fisheries or agriculture.  Howlett, supra note 
97, at 40.  For example, the forest practice standards along the British Columbia coast have been 
governed by the British Columbia Coastal Fisheries Forestry Guidelines, which “were established in a 
classic bargaining process between the federal Department of Fisheries and Oceans, the B.C. Ministry 
of Forests, the B.C. Ministry of Environment, and the industry trade group, the Council on Forest 
Industries.”  Hoberg, supra note 197, at 354.  These guidelines established standards for maximum cut 
and watershed buffer zones in coastal forested areas, though they were non-binding.  See id. (discussing 
specifications in the British Columbia Coastal Fisheries Forestry Guidelines). 
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environmental policy.
252
  The trade and commerce power operates quite 
differently in Canada than does the Commerce Clause in the United States, 
and “[w]hile American courts have had no trouble reading into their 
federal interstate commerce power the power to regulate the environment, 
Canadian courts have read Canada’s federal trade and commerce power 
restrictively,”253 thus limiting its application to environmental law.  The 
POGG clause, in turn, has been described as “the poor Canadian cousin of 
the American commerce clause,”254 has historically been controversial, and 
“its full extent is a matter of considerable dispute.”255  The clause was 
“reduced during the middle years of constitutional interpretation to little 
more than a basis for federal action in national emergencies”256 and as an 
occasional basis of federal authority over matters of “national concern.”257  
Over time, “the Supreme Court has continued to seek limits on the national 
concern branch of the POGG power,”258 and national concern has been 
subsumed by the doctrine of “provincial inability.”259  Though two cases in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s narrowly applied the doctrines to allow 
federal intrusion into arguably provincial matters,
260
 more recently the 
Canadian Supreme Court “seems to have purposely turned away from 
POGG justifications for federal jurisdiction . . . [and] has preferred to 
channel justifications into other enumerated powers . . . [B]y ignoring 
POGG justifications almost entirely, the Court is clearly expressing some 
reservation about working under the national concern heading.”261 
Indeed, as a textual matter, the POGG clause is qualified by a 
subsequent clause stating that the federal government may regulate “in 
                                                                                                                          
252 See Vincent P. Fiore, Federal Wetlands Regulation in Canada and the United States: 
Suggestions for Canada in Light of Crown Zellerbach and the Peace, Order and Good Government 
Clause of the Canadian Constitution, 27 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 139, 159–60 (1993) 
(discussing the inadequacy of the criminal law power and trade and commerce power to effectively 
support environmental legislation); Rodney Northey, Federalism and Comprehensive Environmental 
Reform: Seeing Beyond the Murky Medium, 29 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 127, 136–39 (1991) (discussing the 
limits on federal powers, particularly through criminal law and trade and commerce powers). 
253 Northey, supra note 252, at 139; accord Fiore, supra note 252, at 160. 
254 Gerald Baier, New Judicial Thinking on Sovereignty and Federalism: American and Canadian 
Comparisons, 23 JUST. SYS. J. 1, 12 (2002). 
255 Dale Gibson, Constitutional Jurisdiction Over Environmental Management in Canada, 23 U. 
TORONTO L.J. 54, 62 (1973). 
256 Id. 
257 Baier, supra note 254, at 12. 
258 Id. 
259 Id.  For a thorough discussion of this test, see id. at 13, and Fiore, supra note 252, at 161–62. 
260 Ontario Hydro v. Ontario (Labour Relations Board), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 327, 379–80 (Can.) 
(holding that the production, use, and application of atomic energy constitutes a matter of national 
concern and properly falls under the power of the Parliament of Canada); R. v. Crown Zellerbach 
Canada Ltd., [1988] 1 S.C.R. 401, 436–38 (Can.) (holding the Ocean Dumping Control Act as a 
constitutionally valid exercise of power by the Parliament of Canada).  See also Baier, supra note 254, 
at 13–16 (discussing the Crown Zellerbach case and the effect of its decision). 
261 Baier, supra note 254, at 15. 
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relation to all [m]atters not coming within the [c]lasses of 
[s]ubjects . . . assigned exclusively to the [l]egislatures of the 
[p]rovinces.”262  Given that the clause is meant to bridge gaps between 
federal and provincial constitutional authority where a matter of national 
concern cannot be addressed by the states,
263
 the exclusive grant of 
authority to the provinces over forest policy could very well lead to a view 
that there is no “gap” in forest policy at all.  The question would likely turn 
on whether global concerns over climate change trigger a strong enough 
national concern that the provinces alone would be unable to adequately 
address—a potentially difficult argument to make given the weakness of 
the POGG clause. 
Even so, some scholars have argued that the POGG clause could be 
utilized to justify federal regulation of resources over which the provinces 
typically maintain exclusive authority, such as wildlife resources, and “on 
problems having such unique significance for the nation as a whole that 
they cannot appropriately be dealt with at the provincial level”264—as is 
arguably the case with ensuring Canada’s forest resources are adequately 
utilized to combat climate change.  Yet it remains that in order to invoke 
the POGG power, “the issue in question must have some ‘ascertainable and 
reasonable limits,’ so as not to impair provincial constitutional jurisdiction 
unreasonably.”265  Ultimately, the Canadian constitutional provisions that 
would be looked to for expanded federal authority over subnational forest 
policy are exceedingly weak, and their interpretation has been purposefully 
narrowed by Canadian courts over time.  As a result, a top-down, expanded 
constitutional interpretation mechanism for forging Fail-safe Federalism in 
Canada is not nearly as promising as it is in the United States. 
Though a top-down approach for achieving federal inputs into 
subnational forest policy via constitutional amendment is equally difficult 
in the United States and Canada, it appears doing so via expanded 
interpretation of current constitutional provisions is far more likely in the 
United States than in Canada.  Even so, a top-down approach for forging 
Fail-safe Federalism is not a necessary or inevitably preferable mechanism.  
While top-down inputs can certainly be crafted in a way that preserves 
decentralized forest governance and the role of subnational governments in 
crafting either their own policies or policies supplemental to federal policy, 
top-down approaches are not without risk.  Improperly crafted top-down 
                                                                                                                          
262 Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c.6, § 91 (U.K.) (consolidated with amendments). 
263 Fiore, supra note 252, at 164. 
264 Gibson, supra note 255, at 62, 65. 
265 Fiore, supra note 252, at 164; see also Peter W. Hogg, Canada: From Privy Council to 
Supreme Court, in INTERPRETING CONSTITUTIONS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 55, 63 (Jeffrey 
Goldsworthy ed., 2006) (noting that early court interpretations of the POGG clause demonstrated a 
“relentless refusal to give significant content to the federal peace, order, and good government power 
whenever it came into potential conflict with the provincial power over property and civil rights.”). 
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prescriptive regulation  
often leads to an increasing spiral of tightening 
regulations, which progressively jeopardise the viability of 
forest management systems through excessive bureaucratic 
processes. Such processes impose considerable costs on 
both industry and government, and often result in systems 
that achieve only the minimum standards necessary to 
avoid penalties, rather than the pursuit of excellence.
266
 
As such, bilateral and horizontal mechanisms should also be considered. 
2.  Bilateral 
A bilateral approach to forging Fail-safe Federalism involves the 
federal government incentivizing subnational governments to take action 
on climate policies related to forest management, which can be 
accomplished in two basic ways.  The first is a cooperative federalism 
approach, whereby the national government passes an act establishing 
minimum forest management standards to which subnational governments 
can voluntarily bind themselves, while at the same time receiving “carrots” 
in the form of financial payments or authority to dictate policy over matters 
that might otherwise be the purview of the federal government.  The 
second approach is one of “uncooperative federalism,” whereby the federal 
government uses other constitutional “sticks” at its disposal, such as the 
spending power, by refusing to fund projects within subnational 
jurisdictions or refusing to provide some other economic entitlement 
subnational governments normally receive.  Under either approach, the 
national government “encourages” the states or provinces to develop 
minimum forest management standards aimed at capturing forests’ climate 
change mitigating potential.  Once accomplished, the federal government 
would be free to commit to those standards on an international level.  
Unlike the top-down approaches discussed in the previous section, which 
are dependent on the respective and distinct constitutional orders of the 
United States and Canada, the bilateral mechanisms discussed here are 
political or legislative in nature and thus would operate very much the 
same in both the United States and Canada. 
                                                                                                                          
266 Graham R. Wilkinson, Codes of Forest Practice as Regulatory Tools for Sustainable Forest 
Management 2–3 (Paper Presented to the 18th Biennial Conference of the Institute of Foresters of 
Australia (1999)) (noting that, “[i]n contrast, a self-regulatory approach can avoid unnecessary 
bureaucratic costs and provide greater flexibility and autonomy for industry, in return for improved 
environmental performance”). 
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  i.  Cooperative Federalism 
Under a cooperative federalism approach, the U.S. or Canadian federal 
governments can pass a “Carbon Sequestration and Forest Management 
Act” (CSFMA) that establishes the forest management standards outlined 
above to combat climate change, such as restrictions on clearcutting, 
afforestation and reforestation requirements, annual allowable cut, and 
stand density requirements, among a variety of other standards.  The states 
and provinces would develop their own forest carbon sequestration plans 
and would voluntarily opt into the program based upon a variety of 
financial, political, and legal incentives.  Not only might subnational 
governments receive funds to implement the program on state/provincially- 
and privately-owned forests, but they might also gain a degree of authority 
over the actions of both the federal government and adjacent subnational 
governments—to ensure that those actions are consistent with the 
state/provincial plan.  Once a state or province voluntarily opted in, 
however, their forest management policy would be subject to the federal 
standards established in the act.  Finally, as discussed in Section IV.A.2.ii 
below, subnational governments refusing to opt into the act might be 
induced to do so based upon a variety of disincentives, such as pulling 
federal funds for projects within the jurisdiction if they do not opt in within 
a certain time frame. 
The CSFMA could operate like a combination of the proposed 
National Land Use Policy Act (NLUPA), which the U.S. Senate passed 
twice in the early 1970s but which was never enacted, and the more narrow 
but ultimately (and relatively) successful Coastal Zone Management Act 
(CZMA). 
The purpose of the NLUPA was to establish 
a national policy to encourage and assist the several States 
to more effectively exercise their constitutional 
responsibilities for the planning, management, and 
administration of the Nation’s land resources through the 
development and implementation of comprehensive 
‘Statewide Environmental, Recreational and Industrial 
Land Use Plans’ . . . and management programs designed 
to achieve an ecologically and environmentally sound use 
of the Nation’s land resources.267 
NLUPA would have provided economic support to states for the 
development of land use management plans in accordance with federal 
standards and would have further provided data to assist in developing 
                                                                                                                          
267 S. 3354, The National Land Use Policy Act of 1970, 116 CONG. REC. 1760, 1761. 
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such plans.  Furthermore, the NLUPA would have established a federal 
agency to ensure that all other federal agencies were complying with state 
plans.
268
  State plans, in turn, were to designate areas of conservation and 
areas of development.
269
  States with approved plans would have been 
required to establish management standards for five types of land-use 
activities that were of “more than local concern:”270  
1) all development in areas of “critical environmental 
concern,” e.g., beaches, wetlands, important 
wildlife habitats, and historic sites; 
2) key facilities, such as major airports, highway 
interchanges, and recreational facilities; 
3) large scale developments, such as industrial parks, 
shopping centers, and major subdivisions; 
4) regional public or private facilities, such as solid 
waste disposal or sewerage systems that 
significantly affect surrounding land uses; and 
5) major recreational or second-home development 
of rural land.
271
 
The NLUPA was intended to “establish[ ] a clear role for each level of 
government and insure[] that their activities would be coordinated.”272  
Perhaps most importantly, “[i]t would have integrated local, state and 
federal systems.”273  John R. Nolon has argued that “had such a law been 
adopted before the complex structure of environmental law was cobbled 
together, the cost, complexity and confusion of the current system could 
have been lessened.”274  The voluntary approach of NLUPA, which 
“favored incentives to cooperate over mandates to conform to rigid 
standards,” was intended to “lessen the ‘needless and costly conflicts 
between agencies and departments of the Federal Governments, between 
State and Federal Government, and between State and local 
                                                                                                                          
268 1 PATRICIA E. SALKIN, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 3:2 (5th ed. 2011). 
269 John R. Nolon, Fusing Economic and Environmental Policy: The Need for Framework Laws 
in the United States and Argentina, 13 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 685, 719 (1996). 
270 John H. Davidson, Ecosystem Management in the Smaller Watershed, 2 GREAT PLAINS NAT. 
RESOURCES J. 68, 76 (1997). 
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272 Nolon, supra note 269, at 724. 
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274 Id. at 718. 
 986 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:925 
government.’”275  In other words, this approach could alleviate the 
problems created by an overly zealous top-down approach, though it might 
also have less bite in achieving results since there is no legal mechanism to 
ensure the standards are put into place. 
Though NLUPA was never passed, the United States has already 
succeeded in establishing a bilateral approach in the land use context with 
its Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA), passed to gain greater federal 
inputs into the protection of the coastal zone.
276
  Many had hoped the 
CZMA would be part of a larger land use management act, such as the 
NLUPA,
277
 but the CZMA succeeded where the NLUPA failed in part 
“due to the fact that it both aided development while preserving the 
environment.”278 
The CZMA program is voluntary, but federal incentives induce states 
to opt in.  The first incentive is simply funding the program’s 
implementation, the aims of which are:  
to preserve or restore specific areas of the state because of 
their conservation, recreational, ecological, or aesthetic 
values, or contain one or more resources of national 
significance; to redevelop a deteriorating or underutilized 
urban waterfront[] or port[]; to provide public access to 
public beaches, coastal waters and areas of recreational, 
historical, aesthetic, ecological or cultural significance; or 
to develop a coordinated process for regulating permits for 
aquaculture facilities.
279
 
The second incentive is perhaps more enticing from a state or provincial 
point of view.  Subnational governments effectively gain authority over the 
actions of both the federal government and other subnational governments 
that it otherwise would not have.  After the federal government has 
approved a state plan, it cannot undertake any action or issue any permits 
for action within the state’s coastal zone unless those actions are found by 
the state to be “consistent” with the state’s plan.280  So, for example, if the 
U.S. Coast Guard wants to build a new facility within a state’s coastal 
                                                                                                                          
275 Id. at 724–25 (quoting Senator Henry Jackson introducing S. 3354, The National Land Use 
Policy Act of 1970, 116 CONG. REC. 1757, 1759 (1970)). 
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increased state involvement). 
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zone, though the agency previously had the authority to do so at its 
discretion, it now must obtain approval from the state in which the facility 
is to be located that siting of the facility will be consistent with the state’s 
CZMA implementation plan.  The same holds true for federal actions in 
adjacent states in the coastal zone—there is a reciprocal responsibility for 
federal agency action or permitting in adjacent states to be consistent with 
neighboring state plans.
281
  Currently thirty-four states and U.S. territories 
maintain federally approved management plans implementing the 
CZMA.
282
 
Though Congress failed to enact the NLUPA, and the CZMA has been 
criticized as inconsistent
283
 and lacks the “bite” that it perhaps could have, 
these examples of bilateral approaches to forging Fail-safe Federalism 
provide models for how a similar act might be structured for forests and 
climate regulation in the United States and Canada.  Though these bilateral 
mechanisms would operate similarly in the United States and Canada, 
emanating from a legislative act by their respective national legislative 
bodies, it is important to note that the probability of achieving bilateral 
mechanisms in the United States and Canada is not the same.  While the 
United States seriously considered the NLUPA and currently maintains 
one such successful program, the CZMA, Canada has had a more difficult 
time even attempting to craft bilateral approaches, especially in the forest 
context. 
The Canadian federal government established a Model Forests 
Program (MFP) that, while not a holistic bilateral approach—since it 
operates on a project-by-project basis—is nonetheless a multi-stakeholder 
mechanism of forest policy formation that attempts to encourage the 
Canadian forest sector to “shift the management of Canada’s forests from 
sustained yield to sustainable development.”284  The program’s purposes 
are to further “create, by national competition, working-scale model 
management areas where a partnership of stakeholders would put 
ecological forestry into practice, develop integrated resource management 
tools to help commercial forestry coexist with other natural resources, 
conduct research, and apply the most advanced forest management 
practices.”285  Given the historically closed nature of the private-
industry/provincial quasi-corporatist negotiations, the MFP is aimed at 
opening up the forest policy-making process to parties other than the 
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provinces and the forest industry. 
MFPs, however, have been met with varying success,
286
 with provinces 
maintaining low enthusiasm for the program, in part “because of the 
federal nature of the model forest project and its potential threat to 
provincial authority.”287  Indeed, provinces have been described as 
“reluctant” to participate in the programs.288  Any absence of the policy-
making branch of government from negotiations understandably renders 
those projects ineffectual, and “[a]lmost certainly the federal nature of the 
model forest initiative is to blame.”289  As a result, “the experience of the 
Model Forest Program gives little reason to believe that such partnerships, 
just because they are based in the consensus process, are much more than 
advisory.”290  Even so, “[w]hile the Model Forest Program has not led to 
fundamental regime change, it does underwrite innovative experiments 
which, however incremental in impact, may provide examples of how to 
govern future forest management.”291  Despite the MFP being a creative 
attempt by the federal government to gain inputs into case-by-case forest 
projects, it seems clear that “[i]f long-term solutions are wanted . . . then 
process reform will need to be embedded in structural reform,”292 such as a 
change in Canada’s constitutional structure that facilitates more viable 
inputs by the federal government into Canadian forest policy. 
Importantly, the MFP is emblematic of federal-provincial tensions in 
the area of forest policy as a general matter.  The history of provincial 
pushback on federal involvement in subnational forest policy, even through 
non-regulatory bilateral arrangements, is quite deep.  When the Canadian 
federal government commenced a “National Forest Congress” under the 
oversight of the federal Department of Forests in 1966, it “failed to secure 
provincial approval of federal leadership in the formulation of national 
forest policy . . . [and the] government had to acknowledge the limited 
direct role of the federal government in regulating an industry dependent 
on the exploitation of provincially owned resources.”293  The provinces 
even resisted conditional grant programs that would have funneled federal 
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money their way in exchange for adjustments in forest policy.
294
  This 
resistance coupled with “an inability to overcome constitutional barriers to 
an increased direct federal role in forest regulation” resulted in the federal 
government ultimately dissolving the Department of Forestry.
295
 
Provincial resistance to even bilateral attempts by the federal 
government to gain a foothold in provincial forest policy has resulted in the 
aforementioned efforts by the federal government either to harness 
international trade, or to utilize a number of international environmental 
agreements to gain a foothold, but these initiatives, of course, “have had a 
limited impact on actual forestry practices in Canada.”296  Ultimately, “the 
new role of the [Canadian] federal government as an agent of international 
and intergovernmental coordinator represents a significant decline from 
earlier eras,” and “the federal government has lost its ability to affect most 
aspects of Canadian forest policy and practices.”297  Given the limited 
nature of the Canadian federal government’s influence on forest policy, 
this information is not surprising.  Considering, however, that these 
statements are made in the context of attempts by the federal government 
to make bilateral inroads into forest policy, they indicate that even these 
types of voluntary mechanisms are not nearly as efficacious as they might 
be in the United States. 
  ii.  Uncooperative Federalism 
Uncooperative federalism is the “mostly stick” end of the bilateral 
spectrum.  Rather than the federal government providing “carrots” in the 
form of positive incentives for cooperation, it provides disincentives 
through the threat of withholding federal funds from states or provinces.  
The federal government may withhold federal highway funds, for instance, 
as the United States Federal Government has successfully done in other 
contexts,
298
 or it could withhold funds that it normally funnels to the states 
to implement other federal statutes, such as the Clean Water Act in the 
United States.
299
 
To be most effective, an uncooperative federalism arrangement would 
most likely need to be tied to a cooperative bilateral statute.  Interestingly, 
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though the NLUPA was designed as a voluntary program, it had bite in the 
sense that it blended cooperative and uncooperative federalism approaches.  
For instance, if a state failed to adopt a land use plan within four years after 
the act was passed it would no longer receive funding for other federal 
programs, such as highway construction or other public works.  Such 
funding would be reduced by twenty percent a year until the state 
developed a land use plan comporting with NLUPA standards.
300
  Later 
amendments to the bill strengthened sanctions even further, providing that 
if a state did not submit a statewide plan within five years, then “no federal 
agency was permitted to undertake any new action or financially support 
any state action that may have a substantially adverse environmental 
impact.”301  In the United States, for example, such a provision would 
grind commercial development in certain wetland areas to a halt if states 
did not pass a state plan, since the United States Army Corps of Engineers 
must permit the filling of certain wetlands for development.302 
Canada has successfully utilized this approach in the context of 
fisheries and agriculture, where “constitutional conflicts over 
environmental jurisdiction have been resolved” by subnational 
governments utilizing “political and fiscal pressures to bring provincial 
practices in line with federal laws.”303  These pressures have “enabled the 
federal Canadian government to make significant jurisdictional in-roads 
into areas that were previously provincial.  These developments suggest 
that Canada has been moving increasingly toward a de facto, if not a de 
jure, policy of concurrent jurisdiction in the environmental field”304—
though this is clearly not yet the case for forest policy, again likely due to 
the explicit nature of the constitutional provisions related to forestry.  
Indeed, though the Canadian federal government has attempted to utilize 
its spending powers to promote reforestation and other practices on 
provincial forest lands, its ability to utilize the spending power to affect 
subnational forest policy has been relatively inconsequential.
305
 
As seems to be a pattern with the other “fortification from within” 
options discussed above, an uncooperative federalism approach might be a 
more viable option in the United States, especially when coupled with a 
cooperative federalism statute, than it would in Canada.  In Canada, such 
approaches have failed to influence forest policy in any significant way 
due to persistent provincial opposition to federal involvement.  To be clear, 
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in the United States the federal government has not yet aimed cooperative 
or uncooperative mechanisms at subnational forest policy.  But given that 
the U.S. Congress seriously considered such an approach in the land use 
context with NLUPA and has succeeded in a “soft” approach with the 
CZMA in the environmental and land use context without state 
resistance—and indeed with broad state participation—a bilateral statute 
aimed at subnational climate policy on forests might in fact be the best 
mechanism available for forging Fail-safe Federalism in the United States 
if crafted properly.  This is especially so if a top-down, expanded 
constitutional interpretation approach does not prove viable. 
3.  Horizontal 
A horizontal approach to forging Fail-safe Federalism would result if 
subnational governments agreed with other subnational governments to 
take collective action to address the role of forest management in climate 
change regulation—even in the absence of a top-down mandate or 
voluntary bilateral program.  In this way, subnational governments might 
avoid constraining national action on global climate governance related to 
forests.  For example, states or provinces could create regional forest 
management plans whereby each agreed to legislate minimum forest 
management standards related to carbon sequestration and climate change, 
such as clearcutting, afforestation and reforestation requirements, annual 
allowable cut, and stand density requirements.  Such plans could 
conceivably create a de facto national forest policy.  This would give the 
national government more flexibility during international negotiations 
related to forests since subnational governments would voluntarily bind 
themselves to a position that does not restrain the national government in 
international negotiations, but that rather reinforces the goals of the global 
governance regime. 
If a top-down approach is a compulsory mechanism for federal 
governments to forge Fail-safe Federalism, and a bilateral approach 
operates by federal provision of incentives for Fail-safe Federalism, then 
horizontal approaches rely almost entirely on the volition of subnational 
governments (though horizontal approaches may themselves be induced by 
federal incentives).  This is the same volition, notably, that currently 
facilitates a great degree of subnational government inaction on crafting 
fundamental forest management standards in the United States.  In this 
way, horizontal approaches in either the United States or Canada are likely 
low on the list of options for forging Fail-safe Federalism.  This is because 
the U.S. and Canadian federal governments would have to “wait and see” 
if subnational governments forged horizontal forest policy arrangements 
before they could assure the international community that any global 
standards related to forest carbon sequestration standards would be 
implemented.  Ultimately, it is unclear why subnational governments that 
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currently fail to maintain individual standards related to forest carbon 
sequestration would band together to craft standards with a group of other 
states or provinces.  Even so, this approach should be briefly discussed, as 
it is not without precedent, and the regional carbon trading schemes 
discussed below demonstrate that states concerned about climate change 
do seem willing to enter into these types of arrangements under at least 
some circumstances. 
There are a few reasons why states might band together to create 
“Regional Forest Management and Carbon Sequestration Standards,” 
whereby individual states would agree to establish standards that increase 
the carbon sequestration potential of private and state-owned forests.  The 
first is simply federal inaction—which has spurred the creation of a 
number of carbon cap-and-trade initiatives aimed at curbing carbon 
emissions in the absence of a federal program.  These include: the 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, including the states of Connecticut, 
Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, 
New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont; the Midwestern Regional GHG 
Reduction Accord, including the states of Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, 
Minnesota, and Wisconsin, and the Canadian province of Manitoba; and 
the Western Climate Initiative, including the states of Arizona, California, 
Montana, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, and Washington, and the Canadian 
provinces of British Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario, and Quebec.
306
  Indeed, 
states or provinces may be motivated to tie forest offsets to their carbon 
trading schemes in a way that fundamentally alters forest management 
standards in order to take account of carbon sequestration potential.  
Importantly, however, no regional arrangement on carbon has appeared in 
certain regions, such as the U.S. South, indicating that the initiative to 
forge these arrangements is still likely to vary across the United States in 
the same way that current forest management standards do. 
Additionally, if states or provinces are truly concerned with federal 
inaction on climate change, as evidenced by the formation of these regional 
cap-and-trade schemes, then presumably they would be interested in the 
significant loss of forest carbon sequestration capabilities that rapid 
urbanization is projected to cause in regions such as the southeastern 
United States and parts of the boreal forest in Canada.  After all, it seems 
that preserving forests in order to sequester carbon may potentially be less 
politically contentious than reducing industrial emissions—though 
certainly there are private property rights to consider in the United States, 
as well as the forest sector lobby in Canada.  Even so, if states and 
provinces get serious about the threats to forests from urbanization, then 
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there are strong incentives to create regional forest preservation compacts 
in order to head off concerns of a race-to-the-bottom, whereby urban 
development interests might flee to other jurisdictions due to forest carbon 
preservation statutes in the jurisdiction in which they wish to develop.
307
  
By developing regional forest policy agreements, individual states and 
provinces can preserve economic growth and development while also 
tackling climate change via forest carbon sequestration. 
Ultimately, there is little precedent in the United States or Canada for 
subnational horizontal approaches to issues related to land uses, especially 
in the forest context.  As a result, the availability of horizontal approaches 
provides little assurance to the U.S. and Canadian federal governments that 
they can commit to international standards.  The drivers for such 
arrangements, however, are certainly in place, with states and provinces 
already taking action on carbon cap-and-trade and facing similar threats to 
forests from urbanization.
308
 
The United States and Canada face similar difficulties in relying on 
top-down amendment of their respective constitutions and on horizontal 
approaches to ensuring Fail-safe Federalism on climate and forests.  It 
seems that expanded constitutional interpretation and bilateral approaches, 
whether cooperative or uncooperative, are far less viable in Canada than in 
the United States, where such approaches would seem to be viable and to 
have a relatively good chance of success if the United States Congress can 
garner the requisite political will to pass legislation.  The next section 
discusses a mechanism for forging Fail-safe Federalism that does not arise 
from current, internal volition to adjust constitutional structure, but rather 
that is created due to external forces arising from civil society. 
B.  Fortification in Response to External Forces: Pathways of 
Transnational Impacts on Domestic Governance 
This Section will build entirely off of Bernstein and Cashore’s 
framework for assessing various “pathways” by which civil society can 
influence domestic and global forest policy via external pressures when 
governments refuse to take initiative from within current governmental 
systems and processes.
309
  Specifically, these pathways arise from 
increasing international pressures on domestic policies that have global 
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implications, like forest management, as “[t]ransnational actors and 
international institutions influence policies by bringing norms generated or 
promoted in the international sphere into the domestic political arena.”310  
Bernstein and Cashore identify four pathways by which international 
pressures shape and change domestic policy.  These include: (1) market 
dependence, (2) international rules, (3) international normative discourse, 
and (4) infiltration of the domestic policy-making process.
311
 
Pathway 1, “market dependence,” is when transnational actors “use 
global markets to force policy responses.”312  The most common example 
is boycott campaigns, where “a company or government faces market loss 
and economic hardship if it does not bow to demands of consumers in 
other countries.”313  This pathway may directly bypass domestic politics 
since consumers drive the government’s choice to change its policies.  In 
other words, though “domestic politics influence the specifics of the policy 
response, the relationship among the state, business and nonbusiness 
interests (the policy network) is relatively unimportant for success because 
the coercive force of the market dependence path affects business interests 
as much as the state.”314  The emergence of market-driven institutions, like 
forest certification schemes, has also created economic pressures in favor 
of more stringent forest management standards
315
 and has “effectively 
bypass[ed] domestic regulatory and land-use policies”316 inconsistent with 
those standards. 
Pathway 2, “international rules,” includes the legally-binding treaties 
that are the focus of this Article as well as trade agreements or other 
policies crafted by international organizations such as the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank—which might require countries 
receiving funds to adopt environmental standards as a condition of the 
loan.
317
  NGOs or other non-governmental institutions like forest 
certification systems can influence the international rules pathway as 
well.
318
  International rules often affect domestic policy, of course, when 
“rules and regulations commit signatory countries to change their domestic 
regulations.”319  As a result, of all the pathways raised by Bernstein and 
Cashore, this is the one most likely to be adversely impacted by 
constitutional federalism since “[d]omestic policy-making structures are 
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also important when states require domestic ratification of international 
agreements or implementing legislation.”320  Nonetheless, despite domestic 
governance structures that may limit direct participation at the federal 
level, assuming these agreements are legitimately negotiated and arranged 
at the international level, they may create a “pull toward compliance” by 
subnational governments.
321
  In fact, though a variety of international 
negotiations have failed to result in a legally binding global forest treaty, 
these fora have indeed provided a “pull toward compliance” with 
heightened forest management standards, as have a variety of non-forest-
specific agreements, such as the Convention on Biological Diversity.
322
 
Pathway 3, “international normative discourse,” effectively involves 
transnational actors engaging in symbolic or information campaigns at the 
international level for the sole purpose of changing domestic 
governance.
323
  An example would be increased international focus on the 
inclusion of aboriginal rights in forest policy creating pressure for domestic 
change.  Such norms, “even when they are not binding on states, can alter 
state identities and interests” and “even if an institution appears weak 
along one dimension, such as providing binding rules, it may still play a 
powerful normative role . . . primarily through moral suasion and 
communicative action rather than coercion or enforcement.”324  The 
problem with this pathway for the United States and Canada, however, is 
that it depends on the “moral vulnerability” of the target state325 and its 
domestic ideology and culture.  Countries most reachable by this pathway 
are those that “aspire to belong to a normative community of nations.”326  
Oftentimes the culture of powerful federal nations is a bit self-fulfilling in 
this regard, in that the domestic ideology of federalism may trump other 
moral pressures as the values of federalism are seen as moral imperatives 
in their own right.  Even so, one of the most prominent examples of 
successful norm influence on domestic policy is sustainable forest 
management (SFM), which has been widely accepted (at least on paper) by 
governments globally, and includes protection of indigenous rights and 
protection from illegal logging.
327
  Another example is the direct impact 
international norms have had on forest policy reform in Brazil, as 
international interest in the Amazon and its global value have directed 
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pressure on Brazil’s domestic forest policies.328 
Pathway 4 is the “infiltration of the domestic policy-making process” 
by transnational actors, which “internaliz[es] the external influence[s]” of 
civil society.
329
  This is basically a scenario where the policy-making 
process is open to a broad swath of civil society, rather than just, say, 
business interests.  When the process accommodates new and additional 
organizations within deliberations, governing officials are autonomous and 
free to consider a wide variety of societal needs, and the government can 
successfully implement policy choices, this pathway may lead to domestic 
change through direct participation of transnational actors.  These actors 
can “provide resources, knowledge, training and financing to existing 
domestic groups, or help organize or finance new domestic-based groups 
or coalitions.”330 
These four pathways of transnational influence have had direct impacts 
on subnational forest policy in Canada, with British Columbia (B.C.) 
providing a compelling case study.  For example, logging of old-growth 
forests in B.C. created a public and media backlash both in Canada and 
abroad and, coupled with international pressure concerning the status of 
the world’s forests, contributed to a shift toward heightened forest 
management standards in B.C.  Indeed, the high legal standards discussed 
in Part III for clearcutting, riparian buffer zones, and annual allowable cut 
limits arose in part out of these pathways,
331
 which further had a hand in 
shifting provincial management to an ecosystem-based approach for 
particular forests of interest to civil society.
332
  Boycott campaigns were 
successfully utilized along the “market dependence” pathway and were 
especially vigorous in targeting clearcutting policies (or the lack thereof).  
B.C. was effectively branded by environmental groups as the “Brazil of the 
North” on forest policy.333  In the United States, legislation was proposed 
in the state of California to ban B.C. forest products and the New York 
Times was under pressure to stop printing on paper from B.C. forests.
334
  In 
fact, due to the United States accounting for fifty-nine percent of B.C.’s 
forest products export market, the influence of U.S. transnational actors 
was significant.
335
  Similar pressure arose from other countries abroad, 
ultimately contributing not only to heightened standards for subnational 
forests, but also to the strict protection of over thirty-eight million hectares 
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of boreal forest between 1999 and 2005.
336
  Millions more hectares have 
been protected since that time, resulting in a truce of sorts between groups 
boycotting provincial forest products and the forest sector.
337
  Ultimately, 
because of the market dependence pathway, “[p]rovincial governments and 
industry have been forced to consider new forest management issues and 
values such as biodiversity, landscape scale management, wildlife, 
recreation, subsistence, aesthetic and watershed management, recycling, 
and climate change.”338 
Trade laws were utilized along the “international rules” pathway, 
though the effects of this pathway on B.C. forest policy are less clear.
339
  In 
addition, the possibility, however unlikely, of a global forest convention 
provides another potentially powerful mechanism along this pathway, and 
international negotiations on global forest standards may have created a 
“pull toward compliance” on the B.C. government.  Transnational actors 
utilized the “international normative discourse” pathway to inject new 
concerns over biodiversity, ecosystem management, aboriginal rights, and 
tropical deforestation into B.C. forest policy.
340
  Finally, along pathway 4, 
transnational actors were able to infiltrate the domestic policy-making 
pathway through a variety of resource-sharing and coalition-building 
efforts among numerous environmental groups—including those 
established specifically for the purpose of engaging in domestic forest 
policy-making.
341
  Some of these groups had a direct role in the 
establishment of more stringent riparian buffer zone requirements.
342
  This 
pathway has “arguably had the biggest impact on domestic policymaking” 
in B.C.
343
 
To be clear, Bernstein and Cashore note that durable and lasting policy 
change requires more than just one pathway, as the market dependence 
pathway alone, for example, will only result in change as long as market 
pressures remain in place.
344
  Thus, synergies among pathways are of 
utmost importance.  In addition, a variety of other factors drive specific 
policy outcomes, and pathways of transnational pressure is just one such 
set of factors.
345
  Even so, the case of British Columbia demonstrates that 
pathways can be a significant contributor to domestic forest policy change 
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at the federal or provincial level, or both.
346
 
The pathways approach has proven to be a valuable mechanism for 
changing subnational forest policy in Canada, and if appropriately utilized, 
would seemingly be a viable approach for facilitating subnational climate 
policies related to the preservation of forest carbon-sequestration values.  
These changes at the subnational level may either allow the federal 
government to assure the international community that binding global 
standards will be honored by subnational governments already engaged in 
such standard-setting, or pathways may be utilized to rebalance federalism 
related to Canadian forest policy in a way that allows the federal 
government to directly implement international standards.  In fact, this 
cursory overview of mechanisms for forging Fail-safe Federalism in 
Canada indicates that the severely limited nature, if not the effective non-
existence of federal government constitutional authority over subnational 
forest policy, leaves a pathways approach as perhaps the only viable 
mechanism for forging climate policies related to forest carbon-
sequestration in Canada—a mechanism initially arising not from the 
constitutional authority of the federal government or the benevolent 
volition of subnational government legislatures, but rather from external 
forces that necessarily synergize to create pressures that contribute to 
domestic policy change. 
Interestingly, one of the facilitators of transnational pathways affecting 
subnational forest policy in Canada arose out of successful efforts by U.S. 
environmental groups in the Pacific Northwest to increase forest 
preservation and management standards in the early 1990s.
347
  This once 
again indicates how civil society’s influence on public forest management 
standards, through the wielding of procedural rights such as citizen suits 
under the ESA, can have immediate and significant impacts—a far more 
difficult task on private forestlands like those in the southeastern United 
States.  Indeed, U.S. environmental groups successfully shifting focus from 
the Pacific Northwest, with its high proportion of government-owned 
forests, to Canada, with its exceedingly high proportion of provincially 
owned forests, and having a direct role in increasing the stringency of 
provincial forest standards, provides further evidence that such pressures 
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are more efficacious when the government is the owner of the resource—
further illustrating the importance of the private-public forest ownership 
divide explored in Sections III.B and C.
348
  These groups have yet to 
successfully target forest policy in the southeastern United States, with its 
exceedingly high proportion of private forests. 
Even so, in the United States a pathways approach might also be a 
viable mechanism for forging Fail-safe Federalism for forest policy.  In the 
western United States, pathways might succeed for similar reasons as they 
would in Canada—as the high proportion of government-owned forests 
may allow for more sudden and stringent policy-change with a resulting 
spillover effect for private forests.  Indeed, for the reasons discussed in Part 
III, all four of the pathways seem likely to more readily impact forest 
policy on government-owned forestlands, as governments are more 
responsive to each of the pressures/inputs presented by each pathway.  
Similarly, in the southeastern United States, where pathways 2 through 4 
are far less likely to be efficacious in spurring stringent private forest 
management standards, pathway 1, market dependence, could result in a 
shift in subnational forest policy.  The huge economic importance of the 
forest industry to southeastern U.S. states makes subnational governments 
and citizens in the region far more susceptible to market pressures, which, 
if properly focused, could theoretically drive climate policies aimed at 
preserving forests’ carbon sequestration values.  Even so, given the greater 
amount of constitutional power available to the U.S. federal government 
relative to the Canadian federal government, a pathways approach is more 
appropriately left as a reserve option in the United States.  Pathways are 
more of a “wait-and-see” option in the absence of fortification from within, 
as discussed in Section IV.A.  While a pathways approach may be a 
necessity in Canada due to the lack of any other realistically viable 
mechanisms for forging Fail-safe Federalism, the U.S. government 
maintains other tools it should first attempt to utilize, such as those 
presented in Section IV.A. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Both the U.S. and Canadian Constitutions allot treaty-making authority 
to the federal government for the specific purpose of allowing these 
countries to arrange their international obligations.  When the U.S. 
Constitution was drafted, for example, it was designed to allow the federal 
government supreme authority in all international treaty matters because 
“state interference in foreign affairs had nearly driven the country to war 
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under the Articles of Confederation.”349  The U.S. and Canadian 
Constitutions, however, also provide federalism protections by reserving 
certain powers, such as subnational forest policy-making authority, 
exclusively to the states and provinces in order to gain the benefits of 
decentralized policy formulation.  Though federalism principles are 
valuable, they arguably place a disproportionate burden on the treaty 
power of the U.S. and Canadian federal governments when and if those 
governments garner the political will to address climate change by fully 
utilizing each nation’s forests. 
As a result, mechanisms for forging Fail-safe Federalism should be 
developed to allow greater federal inputs into subnational forest policy so 
that federal governments can more freely arrange their international affairs 
and can preserve all of the legal and policy tools needed to combat climate 
change.  Importantly, the United States and Canada maintain very different 
domestic forest governance systems, due primarily to disparities in the 
entities owning most of the forest resources in the respective jurisdictions 
and far less constitutional authority at the federal level in Canada than in 
the United States.  Accordingly, the top-down approach of expanded 
interpretation of existing constitutional provisions and a bilateral 
cooperative/uncooperative federalism approach to forging Fail-safe 
Federalism would be most effective in the United States, whereas the 
external influences of transnational pathways would be most effective at 
spurring Fail-safe Federalism formation in Canada. 
Fail-safe Federalism is not intended to completely supersede the 
benefits provided by subnational regulatory authority over forest policy.  
Nor should that policy be completely controlled by the federal government.  
Instead, to the extent that constitutional grants of treaty authority are 
valued as a means of federal governments arranging their international 
affairs related to combating climate change, approaches to forging Fail-
safe Federalism should be pursued.  In other words, federal systems like 
the United States and Canada must adjust constitutional structure if they 
are to most effectively and flexibly participate in global governance related 
to forests and climate.  The ability of federal nations to enter into global 
governance arrangements to address perhaps the most important global 
environmental issue of our time should not be hampered by otherwise 
valuable principles of federalism. 
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